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Abstract 
It has become increasingly clear the last decades that the service sector constitutes the 
majority of employment and output in most industrial countries. While the traditional view on 
innovation and growth has emphasised the manufacturing industry, innovation within the 
service sector received little attention until the 1980’s despite the economic importance of the 
sector. Services play important roles in innovation processes throughout the economy, hence 
it is important to understand the nature of innovation in the service sector. This study provides 
empirical evidence on the importance of the innovation process from the research stadium to 
market launch within services. The purpose is to identify key factors central to the success, 
and, if turned around, the failure of service innovation.  
 
This thesis takes form of an embedded case study of an unsuccessful service developed in-
house, from research to launch, by Det norske Veritas (DNV) to the global bunker fuel 
market. On the background of ten qualitative interviews, challenges occurring in the 
innovation process have been outlined. I explore the blurred lines between manufactured 
innovations and service innovations, asking to which degree innovation within these sectors 
differ. This approach turns the focus towards organisational innovation, discussing 
organisational factors surrounding the service itself as contributing causes to the outcome of a 
service.    
 
On the background of this case, it is argued that innovation in services differ to a degree from 
innovations in the manufacturing sector, but that several of the same factors apply. Especially 
organisational factors play an important role in service innovations, and if these are not in 
place, the likeliness of an innovation to succeed decrease. Studying the effect of user-
involvement, management and knowledge transfer on service innovation, this thesis 
contributes to the integrative approach of service innovation. By exploring these effects on the 
performance of a data driven service, it also adds a new dimension to the characteristic issue 
of ‘simultaneity’ in this type of hybrid service, opening up for increasing the gap between 
production and consumption within the service industry. Although there is no ‘recipe’ for 
successful innovation, this thesis directs attention towards issues firms should be aware of 
when developing new services, to avoid failure and instead increasing the chances of 
enhanced firm performance. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The field of innovation studies is to a large extent based on successful innovations, and there 
is a seemingly lack of studies on innovation failures. Innovation varies tremendously, and 
despite all the research done on successful innovations, there are no easy answers on how to 
avoid failure. Nevertheless, it appears to be some characteristics of failure. Being capable of 
developing successful innovations is a learning process, however, the pattern of mistakes 
often seems to be repeated as it seems to be a tendency to fail to learn from the hardship of 
others (Tidd & Bessant 2013:86).  
Additionally to a focus on successful innovations, there has long been a bias towards 
innovation in manufacturing sectors in the innovation literature, arguing that the service 
industry is a passive adopter of technological innovation. This thesis recognises that there are 
high levels of innovation in services, and contributes to the field of innovation studies by 
elucidating the case of a failed service innovation. Further, it will contribute to enlighten the 
debate on organisational structures in service innovation. 
This thesis will use a service innovation developed by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) in 2011, 
called Fuel Insight to explore the field of new service innovations. The purpose is to analyse 
the innovation process and the stages of development leading to an innovation’s launch to the 
market.  
Fuel Insight is a data-analytical tool developed by DNV as a response to customers’ request to 
get a faster and easier way to purchase bunker fuel. The launch of a service such as Fuel 
Insight was believed to contribute to a more efficient way of purchasing bunker fuel by 
providing reliable measurements of fuel quality, evaluations of suppliers and potential 
financial savings in a market with few such regulations and regular occurrences of bribing. 
The service was believed to revolutionise the bunker industry as it would provide 
transparency by making the suppliers’ delivered fuel quality and reporting quality available to 
all stakeholders. From DNV’s point of view, this is important not only to the buyers of the oil, 
due to reduced costs and more value for money, but also for the environment and users, as 
measuring of fuel quality would lead to risk reductions. However, Fuel Insight did not 
succeed, and this thesis aims to identify the reasons why, using theory and literature on 
service innovation and innovation processes.  
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Thus, the main research question is: 
Why did Fuel Insight fail?  
In chapter 2, I will elaborate on which issues I single out to focus on in regards to answering 
why Fuel Insight failed, based on literature on service innovation. I will look at the theory in 
service innovation on two different levels. I will begin by outlining on a general level the 
main literature, and I will argue that there are high levels of innovation in services. I will 
present different approaches to innovation in the sector and analyse the differences between 
innovation in the service industry versus innovation in the manufacturing industry. I will 
highlight characteristics in service innovation on a general level before I go in-depth studying 
the role of user-involvement, planning and management, knowledge transfer and price, design 
and their potential effect on success or failure in service innovation. In chapter 3, the research 
design and method chosen for the thesis will be described before DNV’s Fuel Insight will be 
elaborated thoroughly in chapter 4. In chapter 5, I will analyse and discuss the empirical 
findings, connecting it to the theoretical framework outlined earlier, before I conclude in 
chapter 6. 
The ESST field of study provides students with knowledge and tools to better understand the 
complex issues of modern innovations; the challenges faced by actors in society; and society 
as a whole, when trying to take advantage of technological and scientific innovations. This 
thesis contributes to that understanding by studying the innovation process of a technological 
service from the research stage to the application to the market. It examines the challenges 
encountered by the developers and the company during the process, as well as the challenges 
of the inter-related worlds of the developers and the market when trying to make use of and 
implement new service innovations. 
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2.0 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 What is Service Innovation? 
Innovation is regarded as fundamental to the growth and competitiveness of firms and 
economies (van der Aa & Elfring 2002:155, Tether & Tajar 2008:720). For an innovation to 
be successful, it has to be novel and to generate positive outputs for the producer and the 
consumer. An innovation is the “commercial application (…) of a new process or product” 
(Freeman 1982:110); the successful exploitation of something qualitatively new (Smith 
2005:149). Thus, when analysing innovations, one has to pay attention towards market 
development, organisational behaviour and financial and project management, to mention 
some important factors (Tidd & Bessant 2013:19).  
 
While there has been a bias towards research on innovation in the manufacturing industry, 
innovation in services has received less attention in the innovation theory. The debate on the 
causes for, and consequences of growth in the service sector dates back to the 1930s, and it 
has long been argued that services are dismissed as ‘supplier-dominated’ users of 
technologies instead of true innovators, as substantial research and knowledge on service 
industries as innovators is lacking (van der Aa & Elfring 2002:157, Tether & Tajar 2008:722). 
This bias has contributed to an underrating of the innovative performance of service activities. 
The debate still has not reached a ground of agreement, but in the later years, the focus on 
innovation in services has gained more attention (Drejer 2004:551, Tether & Tajar 2008:722, 
Gallouj & Savona 2009:150,155).  
 
One of the reasons service innovation has been underestimated might be due to the fact that it 
is difficult, if not impossible to standardise service innovations. Innovation in general is 
intricate, and with the diffusion of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), 
innovation in services is becoming even more complex. Service transactions are produced in 
interaction with clients, which makes each transaction unique. They are produced in response 
to the clients particular and non-standardisable problems in an environment that is always 
different (Gallouj 2002:37). It is also difficult to distinguish the product from the process in 
service innovation as the ‘product’ in services is – in many cases – a process; a set of 
procedures and protocols, a formula, a problem solution or a service package (Gallouj 
2002:40). Hence, the immateriality of the outcome of production in service innovation is 
4 
 
blurry, which makes it hard to measure, as the output is not physically quantifiable (Gallouj 
2002:XV, Gallouj & Savona 2009:154).  
 
2.2 Approaches to Service Innovation 
The literature on service innovation can be classified into three different approaches. The 
oldest and most dominant approach is the technologist approach. This approach reduces the 
service industry to be a passive adopter of technology- and capital-intensive innovations, and 
it leaves out the aspect of non-technological innovations. The second approach, the service-
oriented approach, evolved as an opposed response to the technologist approach focusing on 
the specificities of innovation in services while attempting to develop a specific framework 
for service innovation. It tries to balance the focus on technology with non-technological 
aspects by including the latter in the approach. Finally, there is an integrative approach that 
attempts to develop a conceptual framework applicable to both tangible and intangible 
products (Gallouj 2002, Drejer 2004, Gallouj & Savona 2009). The latter approach argues that 
there is a convergence between manufactured goods and services, and that the boundaries 
between the two are blurry. However, Gallouj & Savona (2009:162-163) argue that this 
approach is slightly underdeveloped, but that it is the most promising approach in terms of 
theoretical advancement in the field of service innovation. This view is also supported by 
Drejer (2004) and Tidd and Bessant (2013:65,449) who argue that the underlying innovation 
processes between service innovation and manufacturing innovations are the same, although 
services may appear less tangible. They point out that services are increasingly being offered 
along with manufactured products as after-sale service and customer support.  
 
Services create over two thirds of the added value in European Union countries and the USA 
(CIS-2, Freeman & Soete 1997:4, Miles 2005:434). Both high-tech (software and 
telecommunications) and low-tech (retail, cleaning) services are major innovators, although 
the high-tech services tend to be more innovative (CIS-2). As argued by Gallouj (2002:18), 
technology is unequivocally a key element in innovation in services. However, technology 
cannot count for the full range of innovations, and it seems peculiar that the field of service 
innovation is still not well understood.  
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The point of view in this thesis will fall within the scope of the integrative approach, focusing 
on both the possible role of non-technological forms of innovation and the importance of 
technologies. 
 
2.3 Characteristics of the Service Industry 
The service sector is huge and of extreme diversity, including low- and high-skilled personal 
services, business and mass consumer services and public administration. Service innovations 
are often interactive, and much service activity involve high levels of contact between the 
service supplier and the customer. In modern economies, the service sector includes the most 
concentrated, knowledge-intensive and IT-intensive sectors, as well as the least (Gallouj 
2002:XV, Miles 2005:435-436). The range of service innovation has grown remarkably with 
the rise of the internet. With web-based technology it is possible to customise services to a 
wide range of customers, thus it becomes possible to offer a variety of customised services 
while retaining a wide reach. However, service innovations are often easy to imitate, and there 
are less barriers of intellectual property protection than is the case with manufactured 
products. Thus, the comparative advantage of a service firm may be lost as competitors 
imitate. The risk of being left behind as other firms take the lead in changing their offerings, 
business strategies or operational processes is huge, unless the firm is able to move into 
further innovation. Thus, there is a strong drive to personalise service experiences leading to 
customer ‘lock on’ (meaning that customers choose the service due to the superior value it 
provides) and reducing the churn rate (Vandermerwe 2004:41, Tidd & Bessant 2013:62-64). 
 
2.3.1 Factors of Success and Failure 
As mentioned earlier, new service development is a complex process which has received 
much less attention than innovations in the manufacturing goods sector. While key factors 
that separate winners from losers has been identified in the manufactured goods sector, such 
research on the service sector is lagging behind. Key success factors identified in the 
manufactured goods sector are product advantage or superiority, project synergy, a clearly 
defined product concept, market(ing) orientation and proficiency, customer need and market 
attractiveness and quality of execution of the new product process. In accordance with the 
integrative approach, there is a convergence between manufacturing and service activities. 
Although there are some similarities between the success factors in manufactured goods 
sector and the service sector, the latter does have some unique characteristics. Some of the 
6 
 
characteristics that distinguish services from physical goods are simultaneity of production 
and consumption that involves some degree of customer participation, as well as service 
intangibility and “variability and perishability of the service offering” (de Brentani 1995:93, 
Gallouj & Savona 2009:154). If firms want to remain competitive in today’s market, new 
services must often be developed quickly. Significant risks are associated with such 
innovations as new services can require large inputs of human and capital resources, and the 
need to make the right decisions becomes critical (de Brentani 1995:93). De Brentani (1995) 
identifies several key factors of success and failure in service innovations. Crucial factors for 
success are high degree of customer orientation and client contact. Company expertise, 
resources for marketing and designing new services are central, along with a high degree of 
synergy with management preferences in the firm. De Brentani (1995:99) concludes that new 
services that are continuously customised to meet the needs of the customer are the ones that 
succeed. Other positive contributions to success is for a company to be the first to market 
innovative services, and to be detailed and have high quality execution of the stages of the 
new service development process through highly planned and formal management (ibid).  
 
Accordingly, factors leading to failure in the service industry are identified. Key factors of 
failure tend to include poor planning and judgement along with poor understanding of the 
market and clients, and lack of commitment at the developing firm. Lack of commitment can 
be correlated to the finding that these new services tend to be peripheral to the firm’s core 
services, hence little effort is made to research the market potential and to cautiously blueprint 
the design. Thus, services do not respond to customer needs and problems, or present any real 
improvements over competitive products, and are launched after more innovative firms have 
covered most of the market. There is low corporate synergy, and launch strategies do not 
attempt to make the service more tangible for customers (de Brentani 1995, Stuart & Tax 
1996:58). Factors such as project management, marketing orientation, product advantage, 
customer need and quality execution of the new product are also identified in the service 
sector. These factors might be more intangible and difficult to identify in service activities 
due to the simultaneity of production and consumption and the ‘fuzzy nature’ of service 
products (Gallouj 2002:XV, Gallouj & Savona 2009:153).  
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2.3.2 Organisational Innovation 
In addition to the characteristics mentioned above, there has also been identified a number of 
innovation forms that are of special relevance to firms in the service industry (van der Aa & 
Elfring 2002). These are forms of organisational innovation that have proven to play a 
significant role in the service industry. The first form focuses on the reproduction of the 
service management system when a firm expands; the importance of standardising the 
services as well as making the concept as explicit as possible; and on internal benchmarking 
of managerial and limited experimentation. The second form focuses on creating new 
combinations of services that in turn will lead to innovations. The third emphasises that as the 
process of producing services is more open than the manufacturing process, customers have a 
great opportunity to influence parts of the service process. The flexibility between the activity 
of the producer and that of the customer provides opportunity for new organisational 
arrangements, hence the customer’s role as co-producer of new service innovations is 
emphasised. Although being categorised into three forms of organisational innovation, these 
forms reflect the attributes characterising innovation in the service industry mentioned in 
section 2.3. The examples of success and failures, along with the different forms of 
organisational innovation, show a clear emphasis on the importance of including users, of 
highly planned and well executed management and of new combinations of linkages to 
improve the service experience.  
 
2.3.3 High Innovators 
As reflected in the literature on service innovation, the sector is wide, and several 
characteristics are mentioned. Due to the size and complexity of the sector, it is hard to 
identify common characteristics for service innovators. However, a study executed by Tidd 
and Bessant (2013:449-453) on 100 service businesses generated some findings on common 
characteristics for this sector. According to the study, high innovators spend more on R&D, 
they often have experienced technology change, and it usually takes them less than one year 
to introduce new service concepts to the market. These high innovators are also more likely to 
compete in open markets dominated by international trade. They tend to avoid 
overcomplicating their customer base, and they usually have fewer key customers who 
account for a high proportion of their total income. High innovators are also more likely to 
focus their purchases on a few, but larger suppliers, as well as they are less vertically 
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integrated. The ‘innovation winners’ in the study are using parity pricing as it tends to be 
difficult to persuade customers to pay for new services at a premium.  
    
The literature on service innovation may seem rather ambiguous. How close should a firm be 
to the market and the users? To what extent should one listen closely to the feedback 
provided? To what extent does knowledge transfer occur through tools, tasks, people and their 
sub-networks, and is it efficient? The term disruptive innovation introduced by Clayton 
Christensen and elaborated further in his book ‘The Innovator’s Dilemma’ (1997), is debated 
and criticised for being generalising based on a limited number of cases.1 This critique 
contributes to the ambiguous nature of innovations; when should one follow practices of good 
management? When does it lead to success, and when does it lead to failure? Is there a 
‘recipe’ for successful innovation?  
 
When studying the innovation process of a case such as Fuel Insight, there are several 
approaches to choose from. The reasons why the service did not succeed are manifold, but in 
this thesis I identify three reasons I consider of major importance in explaining why Fuel 
Insight failed. As the general presentation of the literature on service innovation has posed, 
service innovation share several characteristics with innovation in manufacturing industries. 
However, there are some characteristics that stand out as crucial in the service industry, and 
these are user-involvement, knowledge transfer from the firm to the market, and thoroughly 
planned and highly executed management. Attempting to answer how Fuel Insight came to 
fail, I hereby introduce three sub-questions targeting characteristics that seem to be of crucial 
importance in the service sector: Was user-involvement sufficient? How was the project 
managed; was management planning sufficient? How was technical knowledge transferred to 
the market? 
 
This brings us to the next part of the thesis. Here I will go in-depth, constructing a theoretical 
framework to answer the sub-research questions. Firstly, I will discuss the role of the user, 
before innovation management will be studied. Finally, I review literature on knowledge 
transfer, discussing how new combinations can be combined into a new concept, and how this 
new concept is communicated and commercialised to the market. It is important to keep in 
                                                 
1 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/the-disruption-machine  
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mind that the issues of user-involved innovation, management and knowledge transfer are not 
mutually exclusive, but that they are related and share same characteristics to a certain extent.  
 
2.4 User-Led Innovation 
A firm’s ability to include users in the innovation process is outlined by literature on the 
service sector as crucial in order to succeed. The role of the consumer as co-producer receives 
a great deal of attention in innovation studies on service innovation, as customers are 
identified as the most important type of collaboration partner (Drejer 2004:552,555). Users 
are a heterogeneous group, and although this poses difficulties, the success of new products 
are improved when user needs and preferences are fully understood (Flowers & Henwood 
2010:163). Innovation has become more open, and innovation is now to a larger extent than 
ever driven by networks of individual users and not firms. In many sectors one can find active 
users within all stages of the innovation process (Tidd & Bessant 2013:492). User-led 
innovation can take form of engaging one or several customers or users, and sometimes even 
involves including communities which create and use innovative solutions on an ongoing 
basis (Flowers & Henwood 2010:114, Tidd & Bessant 2013:254). This part of the thesis will 
structure a theoretical framework on the role of users in service innovation which in turn will 
be discussed along with the empirical findings in the analysis to decide whether user-
involvement was sufficient in the case of Fuel Insight. 
 
As mentioned earlier, service innovation is relatively easy to imitate, and it is important that 
firms renew themselves and move into further innovation in order to keep their competitive 
advantage. As we have seen, end-user understanding is crucial to success as many services are 
simultaneously created and consumed. Thus, successful service innovation is highly 
dependent on demand side knowledge (de Brentani 1995:101, Flowers & Henwood 
2010:163). Compared to manufacturing organisations, service businesses may not always 
have a formal R&D department, and they are less likely to engage in R&D. However, almost 
half of the service firms studied in the Community Innovation Survey 2 engaged in R&D 
(CIS-2, Miles 2005:436-437). It is argued that these firms undertake a developing process 
similar to that of manufacturing firms. This process includes search, experiment and 
prototyping, before the product eventually is launched onto the market. The search process 
will often have a much stronger emphasis on the demand side than in manufacturing firms, 
while the experiment and prototyping process often extends from laboratory testing to trials 
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with potential end-users. Although service businesses might not have a formal R&D 
department, they still engage in the same sort of activities. However, it involves a much 
higher level of user insight and experience than that of manufacturing firms (CIS-2, Miles 
2005:438, Tidd & Bessant 2013:65).  
 
2.4.1 Lead-Users 
There are several good reasons to involve users in the innovation process. Sometimes, users 
are ahead of the market when their ideas (and sometimes frustrations with existing solutions) 
create early versions of what later become prevailing innovations. Motives to engage users in 
the development process may be the desire to acquire knowledge from the users and to 
achieve so-called user ‘buy-in’, i.e. that the user approves of the innovation and assures to use 
it (Tidd & Bessant 2013:375). Thus, engaging users in co-creating innovative solutions might 
be a smart strategy as these are often ahead of the market in terms of innovation needs 
(Gallouj 2009:154, Flowers & Henwood 2010:114). Especially identifying so-called ‘lead-
users’ is of vital importance. Lead-users will often be early adopters, but they are also active 
innovators. These users might require something at a higher level than the current 
performance that does not yet exist in the market, and their ideas and insights can create new 
services (or products) that later might become an integral part of mainstream expectations and 
even create new markets. This kind of innovation is called disruptive innovation, and it 
focuses on needs that are not being met, or poorly met. It can also target areas where there is 
an overshoot (Flowers & Henwood 2010:114, Tidd & Bessant 2013:245).2 However, it is 
important to understand that the relationship between user involvement and user satisfaction 
is not straightforward. Very low levels of user involvement are associated with user 
dissatisfaction, but comprehensive user involvement does not necessarily result in user 
satisfaction (Tidd & Bessant 2013:375). However, as we have seen, service firms engaging in 
extensive customer orientation and client contact have the highest success rate (de Brentani 
1995:99). 
 
Whose needs should one address when involving users in the innovation process? Users are 
not a homogenous group, and potential users may have very different needs. This diversity 
can trigger innovations and new directions (Miles 2005:437, Flowers & Henwood 2010:168). 
Hence, a service business that seeks to develop innovative and complex services should look 
                                                 
2 http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/  
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within the customer base to identify possible lead users that are ahead of the market and 
recognise requirements early. They should be able to identify and develop their own 
innovations, and they should be perceived to be pioneering and innovative. The aim is that 
these users will contribute to the co-development and early adaption of the innovation. Such 
lead users might also be able to “provide insights to forecasting the diffusion of innovations” 
(de Brentani 1995, Flowers & Henwood 2010:114, Tidd & Bessant 2013:491). 
 
2.4.2 Pilot Runs and Design 
It is argued that the importance of design is not well understood and that it has a reduced 
status in services. As the understanding of design in services has received more attention, use 
of testing and pilot runs with trial users in the innovation process has increased. It is argued 
that the risk of failure can best be avoided through controlled experiments and field pilot trials 
(Stuart & Tax 1996:63). Involving potential customers or lead-users in this pilot testing to get 
feedback on the service and its usability, whether the design is appealing to the users and 
evaluate the service’s user-friendliness, is of vital importance to succeed. If an innovation is 
not used by customers or clients, it is not successful. But “if the users of new products and 
services are involved in designing what they need, there is generally a better chance of 
success than if something is being designed for them” (Dodgson & Gann 2010:54). Active 
communication and engagement between producer and customer can overcome barriers 
between the actors, identifying demands and needs that are articulated across organisational 
boundaries between the producers and their customers and suppliers (ibid). However, 
customers may also hinder innovation as they can be conservative and locked into ways of 
doing things that inhibit novelty and risk. This is what Christensen (1997) named ‘the 
innovator’s dilemma’ – the problem of listening too closely to the customers. By responding 
too immediate to customer’s demands, innovators might risk to miss out on big changes 
occurring in markets and technology that eventually can put them out of business. Instead 
there is an advantage in working with ‘lead users’ or firms, individuals and governments who 
are prepared to take risks to promote innovation (Dodgson & Gann 2010:56). 
 
As users are getting more involved in the innovation process, as well as extending and 
developing technologies by themselves, the boundaries between consumers and producers has 
become less distinct. As if innovation was not complex enough to begin with, this turn 
towards a more open and democratised process has made it even more complex (Gallouj & 
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Savona 2009, Flowers & Henwood 2010:230, Tidd & Bessant 2013:492). It is also important 
to note here that customer expectations change over time, and recognising these changes are 
of vital importance for a firm to stay atop in its industry (Stuart & Tax 1996:69). Hence, 
involving users in the innovation processes is closely connected to, and has implications for 
our understanding of the management of innovation.  
 
2.5 Innovation Management 
Seeking to identify and promote ‘best practice’ management and organisation is dominant in 
the management research and literature. However, it is being argued that “different types of 
organizational structures and management processes are appropriate for different kinds of 
tasks” (Tidd & Hull 2003:4). As discussed earlier, commitment, judgement and planning on 
the part of managers is a crucial key factor in service innovation. Regarding management 
prescriptions, also the majority of research has been based on experience from manufacturing 
sectors. Within this field of research, there are two main stands, where the majority seems to 
think that management practices can be applied equally in manufacturing and service sectors. 
Others argue that services differ fundamentally from manufacturing sectors. There is also a 
third stand which argue that there do exist some generic practices which apply to both service 
and manufacturing offerings, but that management and organisation must be matched to the 
specific technology and market environment (Christensen 1997:9, Tidd & Hull 2003:4). As 
already emphasised, there is great variety in the service industry, and one must be careful 
when making generalisations about this sector. However, some differences between 
manufacturing and service operations that challenges innovation management are identified. 
One of these differences is the already mentioned ‘simultaneity’. While there is a greater lag 
between production and consumption of manufacturing goods, this is almost non-existent in 
many services. This creates challenges for capacity planning and quality management, as it is 
more difficult to correct errors in services. The issue of ‘storage’ does also create problems 
for capacity management as services usually cannot be stored, and thus this inability to hold 
stocks can create challenges matching supply and demand. Identifying the differences 
between goods and services is important because these differences require a different 
approach to organisation and management (Miles 2005:435, Tidd & Bessant 2013:448-449).   
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2.5.1 The Role of the Manager 
The ability to manage innovative knowledge is crucial because it can lead to a sustained 
competitive advantage and a continuous increase in enterprise benefits (Tsai 2009:11324). 
However, ‘the innovator’s dilemma’ argues that competent and logical management decisions 
that are critical to the success of companies are also the reasons why some companies lose 
their positions of leadership. There are examples of well-managed firms where good 
management was the main reason why the firms failed to keep their competitive advantage 
and stay atop their industries. The reasons emphasised is that because they carefully studied 
market trends, listened to their customers and invested in technologies corresponding to the 
customers’ wishes, they lost their leading positions. This implies that what are widely 
accepted principles of good management are highly situational (Christensen 1997:xii-xvi).  
 
Research suggest that leadership directly and indirectly account for “half of the variance in 
performance observed across organisations” (Tidd & Bessant 2013:112). Of this, direct 
influence counts for 15 percent of the differences found in performance of businesses, and 
indirectly it contributes to an additional 35 percent through the choice of business strategy 
(Bowman & Helfat 2001). The role of the leader has been further elaborated through a study 
of scientists where it was found that inputs from the leader was valued in the beginning of a 
new project, and that feedback was appreciated at later stages to achieve insights on the 
implications of their work. The study thus concluded that rather than to simply generate ideas, 
providing feedback and evaluation is one of the key roles of creative management (Farris 
1972:26). 
 
2.5.2 Price and Planning 
A firm might fail when it gives customers more than they need or ultimately are willing to 
pay for. It tends to be difficult to persuade customers to pay for new services at a premium, 
hence several firms characterised as innovation winners are using parity pricing. By doing 
this, the firm’s service advantage is being used to increase growth rather than exploiting it for 
maximum immediate profits (Tidd & Bessant 2013:449).  
 
However, the management’s understanding of market needs is not the only crucial role of a 
manager. Commitment from the top management is highly associated with successful 
innovation (de Brentani 1995). There is a lot of uncertainty connected with innovation, thus 
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long-term commitment from the management is important, as returns might not emerge 
quickly. The top management must be aware of, and prepared to take risks, as well as 
accepting failure, which is an opportunity for learning and development (Christensen 
1997:228). They also need to have knowledge on factors affecting new service performance. 
However, it is important to note that innovation might happen in spite of senior management. 
Leadership and commitment does not always have to be an active change agent, but it is 
definitely a key factor to successful innovation (Tidd & Bessant 2013:110-111). The planning 
process is an important aspect of quality management as planning efforts – such as process 
design and analysis, market research and staffing levels and training – are often linked with 
the introduction of new products and services (Stuart & Tax 1996:62). A company that does 
not have a systematic or planned way of targeting its development resources towards 
customers’ needs will fail. Additionally, the organisation’s structure is an important asset. The 
way an organisation is structured and the way its employees work together is important as this 
can affect the way the firm can and cannot design products (Christensen 1997:30,84). 
 
Despite all the theory on ‘best practice management’, Christensen (1997:225) argues that 
“managing better, working harder, and not making so many dumb mistakes is not the answer 
to the innovator’s dilemma”. He argues that managers who leave room to try and fail, learn 
quickly and try again, can succeed at developing an understanding of markets, customers and 
technology needed to commercialise their innovations. But in practice, it is the company’s 
customers who effectively control what the company can and cannot do, and the challenge is 
to break out of customer control (Christensen 1997:101-104,228). 
 
2.6 Knowledge Transfer 
Research shows that a majority of service firms look for and create new combinations of 
services in order to meet customer needs and become more efficient and competitive (van der 
Aa & Elfring 2002:161-162). However, adding new services to an existing service portfolio 
does not necessarily indicate innovation. Hence, it is crucial to know how to meet market 
demand and target the market through beneficial commercialisation when launching new 
technologies. 
  
Innovation is the commercial use of a new (or improved) equipment or process. Thus, for an 
invention to be an innovation it has to create value, and in order to create value, it must be 
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applicable to needs in society. Knowledge produced in a laboratory or in any type of 
technology or knowledge-specific environment might seem incomprehensible for someone 
from the outside. Therefore, the challenge when developing an innovation from ‘scratch’, is to 
make it comprehensible for the market, or at least the targeted customer group, being aware 
that culture and institutions are important components of knowledge (Mokyr 2002:18). Thus, 
as an innovator, or an innovating firm, it is important to understand the cultural context within 
which one is operating, and to know how to target customers with the right type of marketing. 
Basically, if an innovation, be it service or manufactured, is to be successfully launched and 
adopted by customers, the developers of the innovation have to know how to ‘decode’ the 
technical knowledge and to ‘translate’ it into a language that the customer speaks (Latour 
1983:145, Mokyr 2002:14,18). In other words, scientific and technical knowledge is often 
codified by developing a suitable vocabulary. This language used to exchange technical 
messages is not the same language as that of the broader community and market (Breschi & 
Lissoni 2001:988). Thus, knowledge transfer from researchers and the laboratory to a wider 
audience when launching innovations is crucial.  
 
2.6.1 Scaling from Research 
New technologies or new combinations of existing technologies to improve the service 
experience can be developed in-house or with external expertise (Bekkers & Freitas 
2008:1848). Several firms have in-house expertise or collaborate with research institutes or 
universities in their development of innovations (Beise & Stahl 1999:398,406). Although this 
kind of research and knowledge transfer is expected to have an important influence on the 
commercialisation of research, this research “seldom leads to ready-to-produce innovations” 
(Beise & Stahl 1999:409). What actually happens is that knowledge that enables firms to 
develop a new product or process is transferred (ibid). When analysing commercialisation 
from university scientists and research to the industry, low levels of commercialisation have 
been reported. This is explained in structural terms of the faculty and university system and 
culture, as well as it is argued that scientists and researchers have little knowledge on markets 
and the commercial value of new knowledge (O’Gorman et al. 2008:24). This thesis argues 
that the low levels of commercialisation from universities can also be applicable to scientists 
and researchers working in firms and their knowledge on how to target potential customers in 
a language understood by the broader community. Studying the in-house development of a 
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service innovation, this thesis provides a good case as it exposes the innovation process from 
research to market, encountering challenges of commercialisation and knowledge transfer. 
 
Argote and Ingram (2000) developed a framework in which they argue that the creation and 
transfer of knowledge is “a basis for competitive advantage in firms”. They define knowledge 
transfer in organisations as “the process through which one unit (e.g. group, department, or 
division) is affected by the experience of another” (Argote & Ingram 2000:151). This ability 
to transfer knowledge from one unit to another contributes to the organisational performance 
of firms in the service and in the manufacturing sector. Further, Argote and Ingram 
(2000:153) argue that in an organisation, knowledge is embedded in the three basic elements 
members; tools and tasks and the sub-networks that are formed by combining the basic 
elements. Members are the human components of organisations while tools, both hardware 
and software, are the technological components. Finally, tasks reflect the organisation’s 
intentions, goals and purposes. For successful transfer of knowledge, tacit knowledge and 
face-to-face interactions are emphasised as crucial factors as some knowledge might be more 
difficult to transfer via formal channels of knowledge exchange. There are also findings 
pointing in the direction that most industries have a well-established informal network 
through which knowledge is traded (Cowan & Jonard 2004:1559). These networks tend to 
evolve in response to agent’s experiences which means that if an agent or a firm has had a 
good exchange with one particular agent or firm, it is likely that one will try to return to that 
agent in the future (Christensen 1997:34, Cowan & Jonard 2004:1573). Hence, addressing the 
well-understood needs of known actors within the network is a key determinant of the 
probability of an innovative effort’s commercial success (Christensen 1997:54).  
 
2.6.2 People and Tools 
The framework posed by Argote and Ingram (2000:158) mainly focus on knowledge transfer 
within organisations. Nevertheless, it also points out ways to facilitate knowledge transfer 
externally. As mentioned, knowledge transfer occurs when “experience in one unit of an 
organisation affects another unit” (Argote & Ingram 2000:154). However, knowledge transfer 
can also occur without the recipient unit being able to express the knowledge it has obtained. 
An individual might use a tool that has been modified to improve its performance, and that 
the user can benefit from the productivity improvement in the tool “without necessarily 
understanding the modifications or being able to articulate why the modifications improved 
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the tool’s performance” (Argote & Ingram 2000:154-155). Hence, knowledge transfer occurs 
when experience in one unit of the organisation affects another unit, but in order for the 
members, tools and tasks transferred to be effective at the new unit, it has to “adapt or be 
adapted to the new context” (Argote & Ingram 2000:156). This is crucial as “a division of 
labour developed in one organisational unit that fits the skills of its members may not work in 
another unit where members have different skills and areas of expertise” (Argote & Ingram 
2000:156-157). 
 
The effect of moving tools through technology transfer has been studied. The success of 
technology transfer attempts varies significantly although this way of transferring knowledge 
through moving technology can be effective. In order for it to be effective, the technology 
needs to be adapted to the context at the recipient site. Codified knowledge embedded in 
technology transfer more easily than knowledge not enclosed in technology. Furthermore, 
attempts of technology transfer have been found to be more successful when the technology is 
well understood and not complex. Embedding knowledge in technology is thus argued to be 
an effective way to transfer knowledge both within the firm and externally (Argote & Ingram 
2000:157-158). Galbraith 1990 (in Argote & Ingram 2000:163) studied knowledge transfer on 
both the ‘recipient’ and the ‘source’ site, finding that the recipient’s productivity recovered 
faster when the technology was not complex and when the recipient and the source were close 
geographically. 
 
2.7 Summary 
In this chapter, issues regarding user-involvement, management and expertise, and the 
diffusion of technological knowledge from the firm to the market and the end-users, have 
been raised. These issues are relevant as they are highlighted in the literature on service 
innovation as crucial components for innovations to succeed. Based on literature provided in 
this chapter, it can be argued that the process of service innovation to some extent takes the 
same shape as the manufacturing process, albeit there are certain differences that are 
important to recognise and pay attention to when analysing service innovation. 
 
Regarding involving users in the innovation process, there is no doubt that this is beneficial 
for firms wanting to increase the probability that they succeed with their innovation. 
Literature provided in this chapter shows that firms that have not focused adequately on 
18 
 
potential customers also have the lowest rate of success. However, high levels of user 
involvement is not a guarantee for user satisfaction. Nevertheless, it is shown that low levels 
of user involvement is correlated to user dissatisfaction, hence there seems to be no need not 
to involve users in the innovation process. However, as proposed by ‘the innovator’s 
dilemma’, one can argue that there are times when it is right not to listen to the customers if 
wanting to stay atop in the industry (Christensen 1997:9,18,98).  
 
Concerning management, it is found that managers play an important role in demarcating the 
direction and the strategies of the firm, as well as supporting and creating an environment of 
high corporate synergy. Findings show that managers play a significant role, but the literature 
does not provide a sufficient picture of the influence different units within a firm might have 
to affect the outcome of the innovation process. Opposing interests, collaboration and 
communication within involved parties in the firm might also play an important role in the 
process of developing new services.  
 
Finally, we turned to the extent to which knowledge transfer play a role in service 
innovations. When developing a technologically complex innovation, it is important that the 
producer speaks the same language as the customer when communicating and launching the 
new service to the market. It is important to distinguish between inventions and innovations 
as a good invention is not a guarantee for commercial success (Tidd & Bessant 2013:19). An 
innovation is not successful unless it creates value and is carried out in practice (Schumpeter 
1934:88).  
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3.0 Methodology 
In this chapter, choices and procedures for gathering empirical data will be elaborated. First, I 
review the qualitative case as a method before elaborating the data collection process, using 
documents, interviews and artefacts. The process of analysing will be discussed before I 
review the validity and reliability, and question ethical concerns of my research at the end of 
the chapter. 
 
3.1 Qualitative Case as Method 
In this thesis I have decided to undertake a qualitative perspective on the innovation process 
of a new service developed in-house, from the research stadium to the launch to the market. 
To undertake such study, I was introduced to the DNV case of Fuel Insight to explore the 
innovation process of the development of the service.  
 
There are several research methods that may be used for three different purposes: exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory studies. Regarding case studies, there may be explanatory case 
studies, descriptive case studies and exploratory case studies. The boundaries between these 
three types are not always sharp, and it consists large overlaps amongst them (Yin 2014:8-9). 
However, one can differentiate between the tree types by asking different research questions. 
In general, what questions can either be exploratory or about prevalence, while how and why 
questions are more explanatory and more likely to favour the use of a case study (Yin 
2014:10). If the intention is to undertake a descriptive study, open questions allowing a 
description of the case in all its particularity is convenient (Simons 2009:32). Qualitative 
studies focus on how and why questions, and with the research question: Why did Fuel Insight 
fail? Was user-involvement sufficient? How was the project managed; was personnel with 
sufficient expertise involved? How was technical knowledge transferred to the market? I seek 
to analyse the process of technological services from research to market, examining potential 
barriers preventing its success. For this reason, an explanatory case study is a good strategy to 
pursue, as it would give further insight in the factors that facilitates and obstructs the 
successful launch of a new service in the bunker fuel market.  
 
The case study allows for the researcher to get a wider insight in possible relevant factors and 
variables. However, doing case study research is one of the most challenging of all social 
science endeavours (Yin 2014:3,23). The case study tries to explain a decision, or a set of 
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decisions, elucidating why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result 
(Schramm 1971 in Yin 2014:15). Gerring (2004:342) defines the case study as “an intensive 
study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of units.” This type of 
study allows the investigator to focus on a case, and maintain a holistic and real-world 
perspective (Yin 2014:4). One reason why case study research is perceived difficult is 
because the data collection procedures are not routinized. The case study has a unique 
strength in the way that it is able to deal with a great variety of evidence, such as documents, 
interviews, artefacts and observation (Yin 2014:12). Relying solely on interviews when 
collecting data could cause damage to the validity of the research. Hence, the researcher has 
to be aware not to become too dependent on key informants. It is crucial to rely also on other 
sources of corroborate evidence or search for contrary evidence (Yin 2014:111). 
 
3.2 Access to Case 
I came in contact with Thomas Mestl, senior researcher at Research and Innovation (R&I) in 
DNV in December 2013 via an email where I explained that I was interested in writing about 
service innovations and the scaling from research to operative services in DNV due to their 
heavy focus on technologies. Mestl turned out to be a great student contact as he already had a 
case in mind that he wanted me to study. He gave me several pamphlets and information 
documents on the case for me to read to see whether this was something I wanted to do. This 
is how I came to use the Fuel Insight service as the case study when undertaking research on 
the scaling from research to operative services.  
 
3.3 Collecting Data 
When collecting qualitative data, there are several methods one can apply. The main ways of 
collecting qualitative data are through interviews, documents, (participant) observation, 
archival records and artefacts (Punch 2005:168, Yin 2014:102). To paint an as complete 
picture as possible of the innovation process of Fuel Insight, I have used several sources of 
evidence to collect as much relevant information as possible. No source has an advantage 
over the others rather they complement each other (Yin 2014:241). There is a difference 
between what is officially told by documents and how people really experience situations. 
Hence, in the thesis, I apply a qualitative method, using interviews with staff from DNV who 
were part of the development process. I have also been investigating documents and artefacts 
21 
 
(Fuel Insight data tool), thus the thesis applies an investigative approach to service 
innovation. 
 
I have collected data from several sources to assure the credibility of the information applied. 
It is necessary to make use of these methods in order to figure out what really happened in the 
process of developing Fuel Insight as they go in-depth and contribute to our knowledge on 
organisational, social and managerial phenomena (Yin 2014:4). Before conducting the 
interviews, it was important to have a basic understanding of the bunker fuel market and the 
work of DNV. I was given the desk at the R&I office in DNV’s office in Høvik, and spending 
a few days a week in the DNV office gave me a unique possibility to observe and understand 
the dynamics of the R&I unit, as well as the threshold to ask questions was lowered. I got 
access to written documents and pamphlets on the service. I was also given access to try out 
Fuel Insight myself. This gave me valuable knowledge and a greater understanding of the 
topic before I started conducting the interviews.  
   
3.3.1 Interviews as Data Source 
Interviews are one of the main data collection tools in qualitative research (Punch 2005:168). 
It is a good method of collecting information about opinions and experiences as it can provide 
insight into differing opinions both within and between groups (Dunn 2010:102). However, 
when undertaking interviews, one has to be aware of a possible bias, both in response, but 
also due to poorly articulated questions. There is also a chance of experiencing reflexivity, 
which means that the informant says what the interviewer wants to hear. However, using 
interviews as a source of evidence gives great insight to the case as it provides explanations as 
well as personal views (Yin 2014:106). In addition to single interviews, I have also made use 
of group interviews when conducting the research. By doing group interviews, the informants 
can help each other out remembering details in the case studied, as well as such interviews 
may reveal dynamics in the group through interaction which will not be apparent in individual 
interviews. However, data from such interviews might be patchy and incomplete (Gillham 
2005:69). 
 
By conducting singular- and group interviews with employees from all involved units within 
the DNV, I seek to find answers and explanations of the relevance of the above-mentioned 
issues put forward by the literature. By using semi-structured interviews I was given the 
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flexibility to ask questions exceeding the interview guide, and to adapt questions to each 
informant (Gillham 2005:79, Dunn 2010:110). The informants naturally possessed more 
knowledge than me on the field, and I wanted to give the informants the possibility to add 
remarks and address new topics during the interviews. Hence, I found semi-structured 
interviews to be the most appropriate form of interviewing for my research.   
 
3.3.2 Conducting Interviews 
Together with Mestl and my supervisor, we figured out that I had to interview representatives 
working closely with the project from all the DNV units involved, including customers 
involved in the innovation process. This includes DNV Research and Innovation (R&I), 
Veritas Petroleum Services (VPS), and the DNV Metric Centre. I was not given access to 
interview customers, and this will be further elaborated in section 3.5. By conducting ten 
interviews, the more formal data collection procedure was carried out. Since the informants 
had different expertise and different tasks during the development of Fuel Insight, semi-
structured interviews allowed me to ask relevant questions to all informants despite the 
diverse expertise. Conducting the interviews, I used a recorder as this allowed me to lead a 
more natural conversation and not being busy taking notes. It also allowed me to pay more 
attention to the conversation and ask relevant follow-up questions. However, I always made 
sure to gain informed consent to use the recorder, and the respondents were given the 
interviews transcribed back word for word for a review. By doing this, I received feedback on 
some of the interviews with extensive comments, and additional thoughts and arguments. 
Although transcribing the interviews word for word is time-consuming, it made me start the 
process of analysing at an early stage. It was important not to ‘lock on’ to hypotheses from 
early on, and I kept reminding myself to keep my assumptions open and be open to 
developing new hypotheses along the way.   
 
Most of the interviews were conducted at DNV’s offices in Høvik, either as singular or group 
interviews. At one occasion, I also went to Drammen for an interview, and one interview was 
conducted over Skype. In the occasions where group interviews were used, the reason was 
that the informants were from the same unit within DNV and had worked together as a team 
on the project. In the analysis I consistently refer to the interviews by using footnotes to 
distinguish them from literature references. 
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When undertaking case study research it is important to acknowledge the strengths and 
limitations of the research. After conducting the interviews, some weaknesses have been 
identified as I have ran across some methodological problems during the research process. 
Regarding informants, there is a risk of biased selection as Mestl took part in selecting 
interviews. However, this is not very likely as this research could be of help for DNV in 
future innovative big data projects.  
 
During the first two interviews, my two key informants at R&I who were the ones introducing 
me to the case, sat in on the interviews. Those informants have been crucial in getting in 
touch with other essential informants involved in the process of developing Fuel Insight. 
There are both strengths and weaknesses to this way of conducting interviews, as the presence 
of the key informants helped a great deal in explaining complicated technological details in 
the bunker fuel industry. Their presence also helped refreshing the memory of the other 
informants remembering details from the project. However, sitting in on interviews like this 
might lead the informant to hold back on essential information. Additionally, this is 
methodologically problematic as it conflicts with the guidelines of qualitative methods. When 
I explained this to my key informants from R&I they understood the importance of the 
methodology, and the rest of the interviews were conducted with only the informant and 
myself present. 
 
3.3.3 Documents 
Documents are a rich source of data, and in case studies, documentary data is often collected 
in conjunction with interviews and observation (Punch 2005:184). When using documents, 
one has to be aware that there might be a biased selectivity or a reporting bias reflecting 
(unknown) bias of the author of the document. One does also have to take into account that 
the accessibility might be deliberately withheld either for privacy reasons or other reasons. 
Therefore, it is important to be critical of the sources since the documents are written for a 
certain purpose in a certain context and take this into account when using the data (Yin 
2014:106-108). 
 
I applied textual analysis of reports and documents from DNV, and the data tool (Fuel 
Insight) from the case study to undertake the research. In this case, documents include emails, 
internal and external reports, information leaflets and research publications. By using 
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documentation, I anticipated to see the progression of the work and to understand to a greater 
extent how the project was executed through communication, feedback and collaboration 
between the involved units. I received several emails and reports from the project as well as 
documents that helped me understanding the reason why DNV decided do go for the Fuel 
Insight service.  
 
3.3.4 Artefacts 
In general it is argued that artefacts are of less relevance in most case studies, but when it is 
relevant it can be an important component in the overall research as it helps the researcher 
develop a broader perspective on the case (Yin 2014:117-118). In recent years, the design of 
the tool has gained more attention in the innovation literature. Although the technology 
applied might be complex, it is crucial to make the innovation applicable for the user, and the 
design is thus of vital importance (O’Gorman et al. 2008:24).  
 
To broaden my perspective and to secure the trustworthiness of my research, I gained access 
to use the Fuel Insight data tool developed by the Metric Centre. This increased not only my 
knowledge of the technology in itself, but also the understanding of what the customers were 
faced with when introduced to the service. I was also shown another tool that provides the 
same service and benchmarks as Fuel Insight, developed as an alternative tool by R&I. The 
access to these tools was important to paint a complete picture of the innovation process and 
the service.  
 
3.4 Analysing Data 
As each case study is unique and since each researcher has her own opinion and way of 
interpreting data, it was important to me to be as neutral as possible when analysing the 
acquired data. However, analysing the same data could result in different results since the 
researcher is a part of the process as well as she is shaped and perceived by societal norms 
(Dowling 2010:35). 
 
Through transcribing the interviews and receiving feedback from the informants, I started the 
process of analysing during data collection. I made notes in the transcribed interviews where I 
found similar statements across interviews, and where the informants came up with 
information that either could be linked up to or challenge the theoretical framework applied in 
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the thesis. When the informants came up with new aspects that I had not thought of, I made 
sure to include this in other interviews to see whether this was an opinion reflected across 
units or just within them. By taking such notes, I often developed follow-up questions to 
validate assumptions or clarify uncertainties that I asked the informants who were all helpful 
to answer my additional questions via email.  
 
I started analysing the findings within each unit of DNV involved in the development of Fuel 
Insight before I started analysing findings across the units. First, I identified statements that 
either fit with the theoretical framework, or provided alternative hypotheses to the research 
questions. Subsequently, I cross-checked statements within and between units to see if there 
were any evident patterns.  
 
3.5 Validity and Reliability 
Doing case study research raises certain concerns. One of the most common concerns argues 
that there is a seemingly inability to generalise from case study findings (Yin 2014:20). The 
counter argument is that well-studied case studies can produce credible, robust and 
trustworthy theoretical explanations and thus are generalizable to theoretical propositions 
(Baxter 2010:96). When judging the quality of the research case study, the reliability and the 
validity of the study is of vital importance. To achieve high levels of reliability one has to 
make sure to minimise errors and biases in the study so that, if a later researcher follows the 
same procedures as described, she will arrive at the same findings and conclusions (Yin 
2014:46-49).  
 
Internal and external validity is important when undertaking an explanatory case study to 
provide a good analysis and reach a valid conclusion. To ensure validity one has to make sure 
that the concept studied, and the interpretations made are well-founded and can be translated 
into an operating reality.3 Internal validity creates credibility during the process of analysing 
by seeking to establish a casual relationship, while external validity is ensured by identifying 
correct operational measures for the concept being studied, ensuring that the findings can be 
generalised (Yin 2014:46).   
 
                                                 
3 http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/measval.php  
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During the data collection and analysing processes, I constantly reminded myself to assure 
reliability to my thesis as far as possible. I remained as neutral and objective as possible and 
conducted interviews in locations where the informants were comfortable. This was important 
to me because it limited the chance of extrinsic contamination to the findings. Since I 
conducted semi-structured interviews that took the shape of a conversation, making an exact 
replica of the interviews would be almost impossible although I loosely followed an interview 
guide.4 The results from such interviews are dependent on the connection the researcher gets 
with the informant as the relationship between the interviewer and the informant is often 
critical to the collection of insights and opinions (Dunn 2010:113-114).  
 
Regarding the validity of my research, I was aware of potential hazards. Although I operated 
after a method using semi-structured interviews, I made sure to have certain key questions 
that I asked everyone to make sure that information I had gained through reading reports and 
formal interviews and informal conversations were correct (Bradshaw & Standford 2010:78). 
I also had to consider the role I got when R&I were the ones wanting me to assess Fuel 
Insight and gave me a desk in their office. I did my best to balance the information I obtained, 
not being too influenced by their viewpoints and staying reflective and conscious of my own 
actions and choices (Dowling 2010:31). It was important not becoming biased in favour of 
R&I as well as making sure to appear neutral especially when interviewing informants from 
other units of DNV. To strengthen the validity of the research and accuracy of the information 
acquired, I chose a triangulation collection of data through interviews, documents and 
artefacts. This cross-checking of the relevance and significance of issues and arguments 
strengthen the validity of the research (Bradshaw and Standford 2010:77, Simons 2009:129). 
 
One weakness to the validity of my research is the issue of the two R&I representatives sitting 
in on the first two interviews. On one hand, this might have weakened my findings as their 
presence could have restricted the informant from mentioning potentially vital or sensitive 
information. On the other hand, in the two interviews where the R&I informants joined, they 
brought additional and clarifying information to the table that might not have occurred if they 
were not present. 
 
                                                 
4 See Appendix B 
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However, the largest shortcoming of my research is the issue of interviewing customers that 
were involved in the development process of Fuel Insight. My informants whom could put me 
in touch with the customers were reluctant to give me information about who the customers 
were, and there was a great scepticism of having me talking to the customers. This is a big 
disadvantage for my research as meeting and talking to the customers would have provided 
me with information from another perspective than solely from DNV’s point of view, and 
would have made it easier for me to draw trustworthy and reliable conclusions. 
 
3.6 Ethical Concerns 
I made an ethical choice of not anonymise my informants. I made sure to ask whether anyone 
would prefer to stay anonymous, but nobody felt the need to do so. Another ethical concern is 
the aspect that the bunker fuel market is characterised with close ties, networks and even 
bribes; thus parts of the statements surrounding the market and its mechanisms may be 
perceived as politically sensitive.    
 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter has provided an explanation for the methodological choices made when choosing 
to assess DNV’s Fuel Insight service. I have explained my choice of conducting a qualitative 
case study and elaborated on the methods of data collection employed. I have discussed 
weaknesses to the research method, and I have explained how I worked with interpreting and 
analysing the data. Further, I reflected on the reliability and the validity of my research, and I 
elaborated how I attempted to assure high quality. Finally, I introduced ethical concerns I 
encountered during my research. This chapter has sought to provide the reader with 
information to explain the background for the choices made and conclusions drawn in this 
thesis. 
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4.0 Case Outline 
In the following chapter, I will give a brief introduction of DNV and the bunker fuel market 
as a backdrop to elucidate the development of Fuel Insight. DNV’s understanding of the 
bunker fuel market explains why the service was developed, and what issues it was intended 
to solve. The benchmarks behind Fuel Insight will be elaborated to provide the reader with a 
technical understanding of the service. This is done to provide a thorough understanding of 
the service, what it was intended to bring to the market, and of the bunker fuel market, which 
Fuel Insight was intended to revolutionise. A lot of the information provided in this chapter 
derives from informal conversations and feedback from DNV personnel. DNV is one of few 
actors who have written about this subject, hence, there might be other ways of perceiving 
this topic.  
 
4.1 DNV 
Det Norske Veritas (DNV), founded in 1864, is an international company offering ship 
classification, certification and consulting services with its headquarters in Oslo. DNV forms 
the world’s largest ship and offshore classification society, and is a leading technical advisor 
to the global oil and gas industry. DNV is also established within the electrical power 
industry, being a world leading company within the market for emission reductions 
verification.5 The organisation is divided into several branches where the oil and gas and the 
software headquarters are situated in Oslo. At the time of the development of Fuel Insight, the 
DNV Petroleum Services (now VPS) with headquarters in Singapore was also a part of DNV. 
VPS was founded by DNV in 1981 to provide fuel testing services to the maritime and power 
sectors. VPS primarily operates within two segments, Fuel Quality Testing and Bunker 
Quantity Surveys, and is a market leader within fuel quality testing with approximately half of 
the global contracted volume (approximately 65% market share) (Mestl et al. 2012:1).6 Since 
the early eighties VPS has done comprehensive fuel testing, and now has a database covering 
more than 1.54 million fuel tests. Annually, their labs test approximately 100.000 bunker fuel 
                                                 
5 http://www.dnvgl.com/about-dnvgl/history.aspx  
http://www.dnvgl.com/news-events/news/dnvgl-top-verification-company-2014.aspx 
6 
http://www.dnv.com/press_area/press_releases/2013/ik_investment_partners_to_acquire_dnv_petroleum_s
ervices_from_det_norske_veritas.asp  
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samples. (DNVPS 2011:4). However, in 2013 VPS was sold to IK Investments Partners and is 
no longer a part of DNV.7 
 
4.2 The Bunker Fuel Market 
According to DNV, bunker fuel is the largest cost factor in the shipping industry; between 
60%, and for some vessels up to 90% of their operational expenses are fuel costs. The bunker 
industry is a lucrative business, and over the past 20 years, the number of fuel suppliers have 
doubled (DNV 2012:6). There are several reasons why the bunker fuel industry is regarded as 
lucrative. Firstly, there are few, if any regulations with respect to processes and suppliers. 
Secondly, there are few regulations in regards to fuel quality. The only sort of regulations are 
‘generous’ max/min limits, mostly set by refineries and not much influenced by the user. 
Thirdly, large quantities of fuel and sums of money are transferred over short time periods. 
Fourthly, there is a split incentive as the charterer usually pays for the fuel, whereas the ship 
owner (fuel user) is responsible for the transport. As a result, the only focus when purchasing 
fuel is the bunker price and not the quality of the fuel. Finally, there are great opportunities 
for the supplier to deceive the customer when selling bunker fuel. This is possible due to time 
pressure when bunkering, which leaves the customer little time to control the stated quality 
and volume of the delivery. Additionally, the ship owner is less focussed on monitoring the 
delivery as he is not the one paying for it. Hence, this makes it possible to reap huge profits 
for profit oriented suppliers. These are some basic reasons forming the business foundation of 
Fuel Insight.8  
 
Bunker fuel is delivered by volume, but paid per ton. The conversion is done by the supplier 
who reports the fuel density. Hence, even minor differences between the reported density and 
the actual fuel density can lead to financial losses for the charterer. Anfindsen et al. 
(2012:109-110) give an illustrating example of how over-reporting can lead to a financial 
loss: “If a density of 977 kg/m³ is stated when the actual value happens to be 960 kg/m³, this 
will give rise to a difference of nearly 35 ton when bunkering 2000m³, the value of which, in 
the current market, is close to US$20,000 – just for a single bunkering.” This phenomenon 
where the supplier overstates the delivered fuel density and thus charges for more fuel than 
physically supplied, is called shortlifting. Based on VPS’ database on fuel sample tests, it is 
                                                 
7 http://shipandbunker.com/news/world/106185-bunker-testing-agency-dnvps-unveils-new-name-new-
branding.  
8 Informal conversation with Mestl 17.07.2014. 
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quite evident that there has been a systematic over-reporting of density since the late 1980’s 
(Mestl et al. 2012:1). Unfortunately, this seems to be exploited by many fuel suppliers as a 
way of “making a quick buck” (Anfindsen et al. 2012:110, DNVPS 2011:Appendix A, Mestl 
et al. 2012:1-2).  
 
The global marine bunker fuel market is estimated to be more than 300 million metric tons 
annually, and with DNV R&I’s calculations, it is estimated that more than 300,000 tons of 
bunker fuel is shortlifted every year. When adding the opposite phenomenon, longlifting, 
(which is density under-reporting meaning that the supplier loses money and the buyer gets 
more than he pays for), it is estimated that bunker fuel worth more than US$200 million 
seems not to be properly accounted for every year (Anfindsen et al. 2012:110). Longlifting 
occurs if the buyer is able to bribe a disloyal employee at a fuel supplier firm so that the buyer 
and the employee benefit from the purchase on expense of the supplier.9  
 
Hence, DNV developed Fuel Insight to provide a service where they could measure and 
compare suppliers, ports and vessels, making sure to get the fuel they paid for. Before Fuel 
Insight, this was done manually if a customer asked for such comparison and measurement. 
Fuel Insight was going to automate these processes and allow for better comparison and more 
transparency in the bunker market. The launch of a service such as Fuel Insight to the market 
was believed to be very attractive to the price-conscious buyer as a tool for assisting in fuel 
purchase and to contribute to a fuel market where suppliers were measured, short- and 
longlifting was revealed, and where all suppliers could be compared against each other. This 
is important to the buyers of oil due to reduced costs and more value for money (energy pr. 
dollar). It is also important for the ship owners who could point to low quality fuels or require 
a certain technical quality of fuel (which was more stringent than the ‘wide’ ISO limits) and 
thereby lowering the risk of engine damage, and the environment benefits from it as it might 
lead to risk reductions (Anfindsen et al.2012, DNV 2012). However, the main reason to 
develop Fuel Insight was to provide an easily interpreted quality measure based on a number 
scale and not raw data.10  
 
 
                                                 
9 Informal conversation with Mestl 17.07.2014 
10 Ibid. 
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4.3 Fuel Insight 
VPS had received signals from customers that they did not have time to order fuel, and that 
they wanted an online solution that could provide them with fuel statistics in an efficient way. 
Hence, in 2010 VPS and DNV R&I started developing the data-analytical tool, Fuel Insight to 
provide customers with a faster and easier way to obtain information about bunker fuel 
suppliers and their previously delivered bunker fuel. The service would also provide an easy 
way to access information on fuel quality and fuel suppliers in different ports worldwide.11 
The service is based on analysis of the large amounts of bunker fuel-testing data that has been 
accumulated since the start of VPS in 1981, which contains information about almost all 
bunker fuel suppliers operating in the global market as of the early 1990’s and onwards (DNV 
2012:5). The customers had access to the ‘Fuel Quality Statistics’ book published annually by 
VPS which provide some of this information. However, the information in this book was not 
updated continuously, as it would be in the online service Fuel Insight. 
 
The main value proposition of the service to its potential users was to reduce financial risk, 
i.e. achieve cost savings in the bunker purchase process by providing info on who is the ‘best’ 
fuel provider (‘best’ with respect to value for money, and least risk of buying fuel that doesn’t 
fulfil mandatory regulations). The primary target group were those who are buying fuel, such 
as charterers and brokers. An important secondary target group were ship owners who are 
interested in the history of technical quality of their fuel purchases. Approximately 1/3 of ship 
owners buy their own fuel, so this secondary group is quite big. Hence, Fuel Insight was 
created to help fuel buyers and fleet operators increase their efficiency in purchasing bunker 
fuel as well as getting the best value for money and reduce risk from their bunker purchases 
(DNVPS 2012b).12 The initial goal was to launch the service at Singapore International 
Bunkering Conference (SIBCON) in October 2010. However, it turned out to be too 
ambitious, and the full launch was instead scheduled for May 2011. 
 
4.3.1 Benchmarks 
Fuel Insight is a way of benchmarking suppliers according to their reporting behaviour and 
their delivered fuel quality. As some shortlifting strategies are not easily unravelled by the use 
of standard measures, the benchmarks offered by DNV provides easier access to information 
                                                 
11 Odland; Stirling 
12 Informal conversation with Mestl 17.07.2014 
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about bunker trends and supplier characteristics (DNV 2012:7). Even though a bunker fuel 
delivery may meet the fuel standard ISO 8217, there will be a quality difference between one 
that barely passes, and one that is ‘best in class’ (ibid). Therefore, DNV developed a 
benchmarking methodology to better characterise the compliance of the fuel to 
 Statutory regulations 
 Technical quality of the oil 
 Reporting behaviour 
 Financial benchmarking  
By using these benchmarks, DNV states that it is possible to characterise to what extent a 
bunkering could be considered to be within best practice. The benchmarks range from 0 to 
100, where 100 is good and 0 is bad, and all levels in-between are possible. The idea was to 
allow benchmark customisation, i.e. the user can determine what is important to him by 
adjusting the weight factor of the above mentioned four benchmarks in the overall score 
(DNVPS 2011:15). 13   
 
Statutory Benchmark 
The statutory benchmark evaluates the compliance with legal regulations with regards to flash 
point and sulphur content. Flash point is an indication of how easily a chemical burns,14 while 
high levels of sulphur contents are environmentally damaging and illegal in Environmental 
Control Areas (ECAs).15 With respect to flash point, the statutory limit is 60°C, and values at 
this limit is accepted, but given the score 0. Values below 60°C are treated as ‘not accepted’. 
Within ECAs, there are strict limits on sulphur contents allowed. However, these regulations 
do not apply outside the ECAs.16 Hence, the sulphur score is measured by taking different 
statutory sulphur levels into consideration, measuring the “probability of having a sulphur 
level below the statutory limit scaled from 0 to 100” (DNVPS 2011:16). In other words, the 
statutory benchmark reflects the distances to the statutory limits and gives “a score according 
to the probability that the oil is outside the limits for a specified confidence level” (Mestl et al. 
2012:7). The reason this benchmark may be interesting for the buyer is that if the flashpoint is 
                                                 
13 Informal conversation with Mestl 17.07.2014 
14 http://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/flash-point-d_924.html  
15 http://www.transportenvironment.org/publications/sulphur-marine-fuels  
16 http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Sulphur-oxides-(SOx)-
%E2%80%93-Regulation-14.aspx  
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too low (easier flammable) or sulphur too high, in the worst case scenario everything must be 
de-bunkered. De-bunkering takes time that the charterer does not have, and high sulphur 
levels can be heavily fined when entering ECAs.17 
 
Technical Benchmark 
The quality of the fuel is the most important aspect for the ship operator (apart from having 
enough fuel). Therefore, the technical benchmark for a fuel was developed. This benchmark 
marks the technical quality of a selected supplier’s products by evaluating critical ISO 821718 
bunker parameters weighted according to their levels of importance and with respect to the 
specified ISO limits.  
 
For instance, a very central fuel parameter are the so-called catalyst fines (cat-fines). When 
developing the service, DNV registered that there had been a downward trend of fuel quality 
over the past 5 years due to rising cat-fines (DNV 2012:10). Cat-fines include very hard and 
abrasive silicon and aluminium compound particles that are required as catalysts in the 
refining process known as catalytic cracking. This method of crude oil treatment splits large, 
high-boiling hydrocarbon molecules into lots of smaller, low-boiling molecules (like diesel, 
petrol and kerosene). The problem with this process is that a small fraction of the cat-fines 
waste ends up in heavy fuel oil, and can be very damaging to machinery.19 If little attention is 
given to the technical quality of the fuel, purchase of oil with e.g. high cat-fines might occur. 
Although the fuel might be within the ISO limit, it may still cause damage to the engine. 
Additionally, there are eight other fuel parameters included in the computation of the 
technical benchmark, such as salt water content, density, difference between reported and 
measured viscosity, difference between reported and measured sulphur, ash content, total 
sediment potential (TSP), calculated carbon aromaticity index (CCAI) and micro carbon 
residue (MCR) (DNV 2012:33). 
 
Reporting Benchmark 
The reporting benchmark measures the reporting quality of the oil supplier. After bunkering, 
the customer receives a Bunker Delivery Note (BDN) from the supplier stating the delivered 
                                                 
17 http://bunkerindex.com/news/index.php (Login required)  
18 http://www.intertek.com/marine/8217/  
19 http://www.westfalia-separator.com/applications/oil-gas/cat-fines.html#c4273  
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quantity, grade, viscosity, density and sulphur content (DNV 2012:31).20 The reporting 
benchmark compares the difference reported in the Bunker Delivery Note with the test results 
from the VPS laboratory also measuring values for the viscosity, density and sulphur content 
(Mestl et al. 2012:7). This information is important to the ship operator because the 
information gained is used to fine-tune the fuel cleaning system. Deviating information may 
result in a suboptimal cleaning which in turn leads to a higher risk of abrasive or corroding 
particles to enter the engine. This information is also important because if it sulphur levels are 
higher than stated, the ship operator (or in some cases the charterer) may be fined if checked 
by authorities.21 This benchmark is also believed to be a good proxy for the quality of the 
supplier, both in terms of the quality of their internal processes and their honesty.22 
 
Financial Benchmark 
The financial benchmark measures how much you get for your money, and is primarily 
interesting for the fuel buyer (Mestl et al. 2012:7). It is a ranking of delivered energy per unit 
(kg) where it is adjusted for short-/longlifting and sediment content (substances that are 
removed before combustion). Energy is measured by comparing delivered energy to the 
global energy average for that particular fuel grade (DNV 2012:27).23 Hence, if a supplier 
wants to achieve the score 100, he has to deliver fuel with a significantly higher energy 
content than the world average, or underreport the density (Mestl et al. 2012:7). 
 
Finally, DNV developed a price calculator where the user can insert quoted prices from 
different suppliers in a port. A comparison of estimated ‘corrected prices’ of the fuels from 
the different suppliers is then possible, based on past fuel deliveries found in VPS’ database 
(DNVPS 2012a:3).  
 
                                                 
20 Marpol 73/78 Annex VI, p.22; http://www.kittiwake.com/fuel_oil_delivery 
21 Informal conversation with Mestl 17.07.2014 
22 Feedback from Løvoll 17.09.2014 
23 Ibid. 
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the interface of Fuel Insight. 
 
To illustrate how the benchmarking method works e.g. to reveal shortlifting, one can look at 
the reporting benchmark and drill into the underlying parameter scores to better understand 
the reason behind scores. For instance, if the reporting score is low, the user could drill-in and 
see that the reason for the low score is shortlifting.24 If a bunkering gets a density-benchmark 
of 100, then no shortlifting has occurred. A score of 0 means a delivery was far outside the 
acceptable practice (either heavy shortlifting or substantial understating the fuel density). 
Although the reporting quality in general has increased on average over the last years, the 
fraction of what could be considered the worst possible density reporting actually grows. This 
means that in order to maintain a profitable margin, more oil suppliers will simply use the 
upper ISO limit, 991 kg/m³ in their BDN – irrespective of the actual oil density (DNV 
2012:7). The larger the difference, the more profit they make, and the worse the financial 
benchmark will become. As a corrected stated density is important for operating the fuel 
cleaning system on board, a large deviation will therefore also negatively affect the technical 
benchmark. In other cases, if the real fuel density is above 991 kg/m³ (upper ISO limit) then 
in order to sell it at all, they simply state it is exactly at the limit (corresponding to 
                                                 
24 Feedback from Løvoll 17.09.2014 
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longlifting). A denser fuel will in general contain more energy and the financial benchmark in 
Fuel Insight would be better, but the corresponding technical benchmark would become 
worse. 
 
4.4 Summary 
In this section, DNV’s position in the bunker fuel market has been elaborated to explain 
motivation behind the development of the benchmarks providing a fuel measurement platform 
on which Fuel Insight has been constructed. We have seen that shortlifting is a common 
practice in the bunker fuel market which is a financial loss for the fuel buyer.25 By studying 
the benchmarks developed by DNV, we have seen how the buyer can select suppliers in 
different ports to increase the probability of getting most value for money, to get high 
technical quality of the oil, to characterise the suppliers by their reporting behaviour (stated 
vs. actual values) and to characterise the oil with respect to statutory limits. This has been 
done to provide the reader with knowledge on the background for the service, as well as the 
methodology on which it is constructed. When launched in May 2011, there were high 
expectations to the Fuel Insight service, and it was hoped to contribute to a revenue increase 
in “the multi million US$ range over the next decade” (DNVPS 2011:23). However, so far, 
this has not happened, and in the next section, I will use theory and case knowledge provided 
in the first sections of the thesis to analyse why this has not happened. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 http://www.bunkerworld.com/news/Millions-lost-to-density-shortlifting-in-2011-116343  
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5.0 Empirical Findings and Analysis 
In this chapter I will present the empirical findings excerpted from interviews, documents and 
artefacts at DNV. I conducted the analysis to answer the following research questions: Why 
did Fuel Insight fail? Was user-involvement sufficient? How was the project managed; was 
management planning sufficient? How was technical knowledge transferred to the market? I 
will connect the findings to the theoretical framework presented earlier in the thesis when 
analysing the data. This will frame the discussion when analysing the innovation process of 
Fuel Insight attempting to answer the research questions. 26  
 
5.1 How to Select Findings  
The theory chapter introduced three approaches to service innovation, the technologist, the 
service-oriented and the integrative approach (Gallouj 2002, Drejer 2004, Gallouj & Savona 
2009). By using the integrative approach which argues that there is a convergence between 
manufactured goods and services, Fuel Insight can be categorised as a service innovation. The 
data tool Fuel Insight is a tangible product, however, it came with after-sale service and 
support to customers as the sales personnel in VPS were supposed to teach the customers how 
to use the tool when they had bought the service.27 Hence, this combination of a manufactured 
good and providing a service strengthens the integrative approach and allows us to categorise 
Fuel Insight as an innovation within the service industry. 
 
When analysing the entire innovation process of a service such as Fuel Insight, several 
findings appear when trying to identify reasons why the service did not succeed. Due to lack 
of space in this research, I can only elaborate on three issues that I identified as the most 
crucial factors for the outcome of Fuel Insight, namely user-involvement, management and 
knowledge transfer. These issues were chosen due to a combination of findings from 
interviews, documents, artefacts and existing theory on service innovation.  
 
5.2 User-Led Innovation 
It is argued in the literature of service innovation that user-involvement is of crucial 
importance for a company to succeed with an innovation (de Brentani 1995, Drejer 2004, 
Flowers & Henwood 2010, Tidd & Bessant 2013). In this section I will discuss the following 
                                                 
26 All citations in this chapter are translated from Norwegian by the author. 
27 Stirling 
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in an attempt to answer the research questions; to what extent were end-users involved in the 
innovation process of Fuel Insight? Did DNV have a strong emphasis on the demand side in 
the process, and was the search, experiment and prototyping sufficient? 
 
It is important to note that this chapter will only contain findings from interviews with DNV 
employees, as I was not given access to interview any of the customers. Therefore, it is 
difficult to know what views the customers might have on the innovation process and the final 
result of Fuel Insight. Not having access to customers is an aspect that makes it difficult to do 
research on failed innovations. However, the reluctance to give me access to customers is in 
itself an interesting finding as this scepticism can be reflected in the Fuel Insight process 
regarding a reluctance to test incomplete versions of Fuel Insight in the market. Throughout 
the process and even after the close-down of Fuel Insight, DNV was afraid of creating 
expectations that may not be met.28  
 
5.2.1 Pilot Runs and Design 
VPS had received signals from customers that they did not have time to order fuel, and that 
they wanted an online solution that could provide them with fuel statistics in an efficient way. 
Hence, the service was first initiated when a benchmarking methodology was available, and 
VPS allowed to provide fuel statistics in an online solution. When developing software 
solutions, companies often release their products in ‘beta’ form, that is, in prototype, to allow 
users to play with the software and suggest improvements. This strategy is pursued when 
companies aim to profit from their products, and it essentially allows customers to do much of 
the final polishing of the products. Excluding customers from the process of product 
improvement can be very shortsighted (Dodgson & Gann 2010:55-56). Some pilot customers 
were involved to a certain extent in the development process through customer meetings. 
Here VPS showed them what they were thinking and they got an indication if they were on 
the right track. The pilot customers did not get to experiment with the service, but in the final 
stages of the process VPS taught trial customers how to use Fuel Insight and gave them access 
to play around with it.29 However, according to informants at DNV, this trial version was 
pretty much the same type as the final product apart from some minor adjustments.30  
 
                                                 
28 Mestl; Odland 
29 Odland; Stirling 
30 Mestl 
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According to VPS staff, the intention was always that VPS would sit down and teach 
customers how to use the service. Although Fuel Insight turned out not to have an intuitive 
and user-friendly interface, it was “never the intention that the customers would look at it and 
understand instantly how they would use it and what it was.”31 Although teaching customers 
to use the service was part of the strategy, the fact remains that customers who had previously 
expressed an interest in such a service, were less interested when the service was launched.  
 
5.2.2 Assumptions vs. User-Involvement 
Involving potential customers in pilot testing to get feedback on the service and its usability, 
the design and user-friendliness, is of vital importance to succeed (Dodgson & Gann 
2010:54). Some of the feedback VPS did get from the customers was that the web solution 
looked old-fashioned with numbers and tables and slow performance.32 According to DNV 
Metric Centre, the interface was limited by the functionality of the tool ‘Cognos’, in which 
they developed Fuel Insight. Cognos is a reporting tool, and not a web application tool.33 This 
limited the user-friendliness and the interface of Fuel Insight, but despite modifications during 
the development process, the final result does still look old-fashioned with tables and numbers 
and slow performance.  
 
One reason user-involvement was limited in the process of Fuel Insight may be that VPS was 
afraid of creating high expectations in the market that it could not fulfil and then ‘lose face’.34 
Thus, there is an assumption that the customers did not feel they had enough influence on 
how Fuel Insight was developed to feel adequate ownership to the service.35 This assumption 
made on behalf of the customers is something that seems to characterise the Fuel Insight 
project. Although some customers were consulted from time to time, it seems the service is 
based on assumptions on how the customers wanted the service rather than including them 
throughout the process and letting them take part in the development.36 The chance of success 
is generally higher if users of new products and services are involved in designing what they 
need, than if something is being designed for them (Dodgson & Gann 2010:54).  
 
                                                 
31 Stirling 
32 Kadal & Svendsen; Løvoll & Mestl 
33 Løvoll & Mestl; Ramsrud 
34 Stirling; Løvoll & Mestl 
35 Odland 
36 Furnes; Løvoll & Mestl 
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The ‘innovator’s dilemma’ highlights the problem of listening too closely to the customers 
(Christensen 1997). Although users might hinder innovation as they can be conservative and 
locked into ways of doing things that inhibit novelty and risk, I argue that this is not the case 
with Fuel Insight albeit the bunker fuel market is characterised as conservative, network-
based and with little experience in handling risk and data analytics.37 Rather than to suspect 
that VPS was listening too closely to the customers, findings revealed in this section point 
towards the opposite. 
  
The success of new products improve when user-needs and preferences are fully understood 
(Flowers & Henwood 2010:163). In this section we have seen that findings point towards 
insufficient user-involvement in the development of Fuel Insight. There is reason to argue that 
contact with customers should have been more frequent throughout the process.38 There is 
also reason to believe that the customers were included too late in the process. VPS received 
feedback from the customers, but since the customers were involved at a later stage, “the 
atmosphere to take in and make the changes suggested from the users was less present.”39 De 
Brentani (1995:99) concludes that new services that are continuously customised to meet the 
needs of the customer are the ones that succeed. Hence, I argue that the user-involvement in 
the development process of Fuel Insight was not extensive enough, and when they were 
involved, it was too late in the process and their feedback opportunities were limited. VPS 
was afraid of creating high expectations in the market, and instead of involving the customers 
continuously throughout the process, they developed and designed a tool that did not satisfy 
the customers. The end-users were not part of shaping the service and its interface, hence the 
final result did not satisfy the customers’ demands. By not involving the end-users 
adequately, I argue that VPS did probably not fully understand the customers and use their 
preferences to shape Fuel Insight.  
 
In the next sections we will look at management and the pricing of the service, as well as the 
challenge of translating technological knowledge into a language the customers understand, as 
other possible factors for Fuel Insight’s lack of success. 
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5.3 Innovation Management 
Managing innovative knowledge is crucial because good management can lead to a sustained 
competitive advantage for the firm (Tsai 2009:11324). Managing in the service sector is 
argued to be quite similar to managing in the manufacturing sector. However, some 
differences between manufacturing and service sectors were identified in the theory chapter, 
such as simultaneity and storage. As the service was never launched successfully, several 
managerial issues has been identified during research that possibly have played an important 
role in the outcome of Fuel Insight. 
 
5.3.1 Organisational Management 
First, one has to look at the DNV organisation as a whole. Three units were involved in 
developing Fuel Insight; DNV Petroleum Services (VPS), DNV GL Research and Innovation 
(R&I), and the DNV GL Metric Centre (IT).  
 
 
These are different units with different and complimentary competence and knowledge. There 
was collaboration within the organisation, as it was believed that developing Fuel Insight in-
house would reduce costs of developing the service, provide different knowledge sets and 
skills and be an opportunity to learn from each other. However, collaboration can be difficult 
to manage as units might have different priorities, organisational culture and tools (Dodgson 
& Gann 2010:58). Developing Fuel Insight, there was a consensus that the aims and 
objectives of the service as well as the genuine wish for the service to succeed were the 
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same.40 However, incidents of miscommunication arose. There were occasions where the 
units talked past each other, as there were different understandings on how to develop Fuel 
Insight.41 Cultural differences between units are also mentioned. While R&I wanted to try out 
and implement ideas quickly, IT was bound by governance to make sure the DNV production 
system would run safely and stable. Additionally, the tool used to generate the service by the 
Metric Centre was limited compared to the idea of range posed by R&I and VPS.42 
 
From the beginning, the VPS management wanted to do all parts of the project in-house 
within DNV.43 However, there turned out to be high internal costs in financing the Metric 
Centre to do the implementation of Fuel Insight. The main reason why the implementation 
was so expensive was due to the process of automating data collection, manage data quality, 
program underlying calculations and prepare arrangements for (any) reporting tool in the 
database.44 This became an issue to VPS as they were the ones paying the Metric Centre.45 
 
Despite a lack of interest for Fuel Insight in the market, the service was available and up and 
running from the launch in 2011. However, with few customers buying the service and high 
invoices from the Metric Centre, the running of Fuel Insight turned out to be a budget drain. 
Therefore, VPS figured they could not keep on financing the project and closed it down in 
2013.46 Although the project was terminated, Fuel Insight is still ‘alive’ (Metric does still 
provide support to the service), however further development of the service is stopped. The 
present Managing Director who was also in charge at the time, gave this explanation for the 
termination of Fuel Insight: “Some way down the road you have to be able to earn money on 
the service. And I believe the realisation was that it was not going to happen with the way the 
cost structure was set up.”47  
 
All informants mentioned resources and internal costs as a challenge, and this is an issue of 
organisational innovation that is a challenge for the service management system (van der Aa 
& Elfring 2002). One of the informants argued that “the result could have been better if we 
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had worked together as one company instead of discussing budgets internally”.48 This 
observation supports the view that the way an organisation is structured and the way its 
employees work together is important as it can affect the way a firm can and cannot design 
products (Christensen 1997:30).  
 
5.3.2 Price 
The price DNV wanted to charge for Fuel Insight is also mentioned as a possible barrier to the 
success of Fuel Insight. There was disagreement internally as some wanted to get the service 
out in the market for free, while others wanted to hold it back to get money for it.49 Those 
who wanted to give the service away for free argued that it would establish a closer tie with 
already existing customers, attracting new customers and increase the fleet.50 However, VPS 
management wanted to make profit of the service, and entered the market with a high price. 
But they overestimated what the market was willing to pay, and when they introduced the 
price “the customers were laughing at us [VPS].” 51 The customers were already paying for 
fuel testing at VPS, so additional costs for statistics was not always accepted.52 Charging 
customers more than they are willing to pay, is one reason some firms fail as it is difficult to 
persuade customers to pay for new services at a premium (Tidd & Bessant 2013:449). The 
pricing of Fuel Insight might reflect a lack of understanding of the market and the end-users, 
as it does not seem like VPS knew what the customers were willing to pay for the service (de 
Brentani 1995). Despite the overestimation of the market, the Managing Director of VPS does 
still not believe Fuel Insight should have been offered for free. “My experience is that the 
customers will not appreciate something when it is free, and it will not be perceived as a 
differentiator.”53 
 
5.3.3 The Role of the Manager 
A third managerial issue that has been emphasised addresses commitment from management. 
To develop and launch an innovation with such impact on a market as Fuel Insight might 
have, is challenging and requires tight leadership. Support and positive affirmation from 
leadership throughout the organisation when innovating is crucial to provide encouragement 
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and resources (Dodgson & Gann 2010:36). Successful innovation is also highly associated 
with long-term commitment from the top management, as returns might not emerge quickly 
(de Brenani 1995, Christensen 1997). In the case of Fuel Insight, there was a change of 
Managing Director in VPS in June 2011. The two Managing Directors who have been 
working in VPS during the process of Fuel Insight are described as two very different 
Managing Directors. While the first one is described as someone who is entrepreneurial, who 
generate ideas and sees possibilities, the second is described as more systematic, and someone 
who is concerned with structures. 54 
 
Although the former Managing Director played an important role in getting the project up and 
running,55 the new Managing Director did never consider to end the project when he started in 
2011. However, as Fuel Insight kept on being an item of expenditure the next two years, the 
closure of Fuel Insight became a fact.56 Both Managing Directors saw a big potential in Fuel 
Insight, but this change of Managing Director in VPS changed the centre of gravity of the 
personal ownership to the project. The responsibility for the project was moved further down 
the organisation to the Business Development Manager in VPS who was one of the actors 
who had been part of the project from the start.57 Hence, it is argued that the ownership to the 
project from management was decisive for the drive in the beginning of the process, but that 
this ownership disappeared when the Managing Director was replaced.58 Fuel Insight was 
launched May 2011, and when the new Managing Director started in June the same year, the 
service was already on the market. VPS kept improving the system based on customer 
feedback after the launch, however none of these improvements did catch on. Instead VPS 
paid DNV Metric Centre to make changes that did not satisfy the customers’ demands.59 In 
this case, it might seem like support, or at least long-term commitment and the feeling of 
ownership from management faded as the Managing Director changed.  
 
5.3.4 Staff Training 
As we have seen, quality management such as planning efforts, process design and market 
research was probably not optimal in the case of Fuel Insight. These efforts, together with 
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training of staff are often linked with the introduction of new products and services (Stuart & 
Tax 1996). In interaction with the customers, simultaneity is key, as it is difficult to correct 
errors, and it is important that the seller knows the service he is selling (Tidd & Bessant 
2013:448-449). VPS has a trained sales team who were supposed to sell Fuel Insight to 
customers. However, the service was difficult to understand even for the sellers.60 The 
experience was that the sellers struggled to use Fuel Insight, as well as struggling to make the 
service relevant for their customers. Or as one of the Managing Directors put it; “Selling and 
having to give support on a software solution that you don’t really understand how to use, and 
that you don’t really believe in is a difficult sale.”61 Thus, one can ask whether the sales 
personnel received enough training or whether they had too many additional tasks next to 
selling Fuel Insight so that focus on learning the complex service came second, and the sellers 
never really managed to perform when trying to sell Fuel Insight to their customers. 
 
In this section we have seen that issues regarding the organisation structure can affect the way 
employees work together and the way a firm can and cannot design products. The decision to 
develop Fuel Insight in-house created large internal costs and incidents of miscommunication. 
Additionally, there is reason to argue that DNV overestimated the price they could charge for 
Fuel Insight. This reflects a lack of planning regarding market research, pricing of the service 
and customer’s needs that are all closely linked to the success rate of innovative firms (de 
Brentani 1995, Stuart & Tax 1996, Christensen 1997, Tidd & Bessant 2013). Findings point 
towards that the change of Managing Director possibly affected the outcome of Fuel Insight 
as it challenged the feeling of ownership and commitment to the service. I argue that a 
continuous drive from the top could have led to further development of the product, 
development of business models and more sale. I also questioned the training and motivation 
the VPS sales team had when attempting to sell Fuel Insight to customers. I argue that it 
seems like the sales personnel did not have sufficient expertise to sell Fuel Insight. Whether 
that was due to poor training or the complexity of the Fuel Insight tool itself will be 
elaborated in the following section.  
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5.4 Knowledge Transfer 
Innovation is the commercial use of a new and useful equipment or process. However, for an 
invention to become an innovation, it has to create value. In the case of Fuel Insight, data 
findings were generated to give actors in the bunker fuel market information on fuel quality 
from suppliers in ports worldwide. DNV created new combinations of services by providing 
already existing data online in real-time together with consultancy services. Behind the 
interface of Fuel Insight are numerous formulas and algorithms enabling the generation and 
comparison of suppliers. This kind of technological knowledge is often codified by using a 
suitable vocabulary, hence the challenge for the developers is to translate this knowledge into 
a language the customer understands (Latour 1983:145, Mokyr 2002:14,18, Breschi & Lissoni 
2001:988). In this section I will discuss whether DNV managed to ‘decode’ this technological 
knowledge and make it accessible. 
 
In the theory chapter, I introduced a framework posed by Argote and Ingram (2000:151) 
where they argue that the creation and transfer of knowledge are “a basis of competitive 
advantage in firms”. To adapt this framework to the case of DNV’s Fuel Insight, one has to be 
aware that the knowledge transfer in this case happened on two levels. On the one hand, there 
was knowledge transfer between the units within DNV; VPS, R&I and the Metric Centre 
when developing the service. On the other hand, external parties (customers) became part of 
the knowledge transfer process when they were updated on the progress of the service, while 
some trial customers were allowed to play around with the software in the end stages of the 
process, and finally, when Fuel Insight was launched on the market and more customers could 
access the service.62  
   
5.4.1 Scaling from Research 
Several firms have in-house expertise or collaborate with external institutions such as 
universities and research institutes when developing innovations (Beise & Stahl 
1999:398,406). When developing Fuel Insight, DNV decided to use in-house expertise in the 
implementation of the service by giving the task to DNV Metric Centre, as well as using its 
own scientists at DNV R&I to derive the methodology for Fuel Insight. However, research 
argues that scientists and researchers have little knowledge on markets and the commercial 
value of new knowledge (O’Gorman et al. 2008:24). Scientists at R&I admit that they find it 
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hard to ‘productify’ their thoughts as they have limited knowledge on the commercialisation 
process.63 Therefore, when developing a service in-house, from research to the commercial 
implementation to the market, it is important that the firm possesses personnel with sufficient 
expertise in all phases of the process. Just as important is the ability to transfer knowledge 
from one unit to another, as it contributes to the organisational performance of firms (Argote 
& Ingram 2000:151).  
 
5.4.2 People and Tools 
In general, moving people is seen as a powerful way of facilitating knowledge transfer in 
organisations, as individuals are able to restructure and adapt knowledge so that it applies to 
new contexts (Galbraith 1990; Rothwell 1978; Allen 1977; Berry & Broadbent 1984, 1987 in 
Argote & Ingram 2000:157). In developing Fuel Insight, the three units moved people to 
facilitate knowledge transfer through workshops to explain their thoughts and learn from each 
other.64 Especially the cooperation between VPS and R&I was described as productive and 
inspiring,65 while cooperation with the Metric Centre was characterised as more challenging 
due to miscommunication, internal costs and limitations of the operative system Cognos.66 
These limitations made it difficult to implement changes to the service requested from VPS or 
R&I.67 Moving people as facilitators for external knowledge transfer was also the intention as 
they would move people from VPS to translate and teach knowledge on Fuel Insight to 
customers.68  
 
Although people are considered to play the “most critical role in the success of technology 
transfer” (Argote & Ingram 2000:164), interaction and knowledge transfer involving people is 
simultaneously considered more problematic than those involving tasks or tools, as people are 
likely to vary more across sites than tools and tasks. Attempts of technology transfer have 
been found to be more successful when the technology is well understood and not complex. 
Embedding knowledge in technology is thus argued to be an effective way to transfer 
knowledge both within the firm and externally (Argote & Ingram 2000:157-159). Although 
Fuel Insight is a tool consisting of codified knowledge that has the potential of transferring 
                                                 
63 Løvoll 
64 Kadal & Svendsen; Løvoll & Mestl; Odland; Stirling 
65 Løvoll & Mestl; Odland; Wetterhus 
66 Kadal & Svendsen; Løvoll; Ramsrud 
67 Løvoll; Odland 
68 Stirling 
48 
 
more readily than knowledge not embedded in technology, there are reasons to believe that 
the technical implementation was too complex for the customers to understand. The idea was 
to allow benchmark customisation, i.e. the user can determine what is important to him. 
However, it turned out that this flexibility/customisation was confusing for the user and made 
Fuel Insight rather complex.69 The tool used to implement Fuel Insight, Cognos, is described 
as being very limited and little flexible, hence, Fuel Insight turned out to be too technical and 
complex with rating numbers and benchmarks with too many options and buttons to click, 
poor interface, poor layout and slow response.70 One of the informants explained the technical 
implementation of Fuel Insight as very little intuitive: “One had to be an expert to use it. You 
did not only have to be an expert on fuel, you had to be an expert on Fuel Insight to use it 
efficiently. I don’t think there were many who were willing to invest their time in that.”71  
 
Although knowledge was transferred internally through workshops and cooperation, there 
were incidents of miscommunication and disagreement on how to develop the online 
platform.72 As the final result turned out, it is obvious that it was too complex, not just for the 
customers, but also for DNV staff. Putting this into the framework of Argote and Ingram 
(2000), it seems like DNV struggled to adapt the technology to the market context. In order 
for knowledge transfer to be successful, members, tools, tasks or their sub-networks that are 
being moved, must fit or be compatible with the new context. However, this compatibility is 
not to be taken for granted as these elements may have to adapt or be adapted to the new 
context (Argote & Ingram 2000:159). Research shows that the recipient’s (e.g. the customers) 
productivity recovered faster when the technology was not complex (Galbraith 1990 in 
Argote & Ingram 2000:163). In the case of Fuel Insight it can be argued that the tool and 
technology was too complex. Thus it is important for employees to learn how to use 
innovative knowledge more effectively as this will improve the capacity for problem solving 
and goal achievement (Tsai 2009:11323). 
 
5.4.3 Commercialisation 
As we have seen this far, DNV struggled to translate their data into something 
comprehensible for the end-user. DNV has years of technological experience, but there seems 
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to be an agreement among the informants that there is a lack of knowledge within the firm on 
how to commercialise and sell data driven services. 73 Fuel Insight is a new kind of service 
that DNV has not had any experience with earlier. This was the first time DNV made such 
automatic data driven service, and there was little experience available on these types of 
services in the firm.74 Hence, it is a challenge to communicate this kind of new technological 
knowledge to the market. Several of the informants argue that external expertise should have 
been used when implementing and commercialising Fuel Insight.75 One informant put it this 
way:  
 
“I believe a lot of good work was done with regards to structure and systematics, but when it 
comes to how to operate the project forward in the real world with user interface, professional 
IT, choosing right technology and all that; we were not there at all. Too much was left with the 
technologists, and too little to business people who we probably should have hired externally. 
Because this is not competence that we possess.” 76 
 
In other words, Fuel Insight was in the periphery of what DNV is good at.77 In the aftermath 
of the Fuel Insight process, involved DNV parties believe there are great things to learn from 
the process that challenged their traditional domain of services and way of working.78 There 
are indications that the focus on soft issues such as corporate culture, knowledge management 
and commercialisation rather than the technology in order to succeed, should have received 
more attention.79 
 
In this section we have seen how the Fuel Insight project went from being a research project 
and was scaled to become an operative service where all stages of the innovation process took 
place in-house. Knowledge transfer appeared on two levels in the development process of 
Fuel Insight; internally in DNV, and from DNV to the market. However, DNV failed at 
translating their technological knowledge to the market as Fuel Insight turned out to be a 
complex and intangible tool that was not intuitive, neither for DNV staff, nor for customers. 
Due to the trouble of expressing technical knowledge within the firm and towards the 
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customers, and the lack of commercialisation competence, it is reason to argue that the 
technology was not successfully adapted or understood at the recipient site, and that DNV to a 
large extent failed to transfer their technical knowledge to the market.  
 
5.5 Additional Findings 
As mentioned, the space provided in this research limits a thorough elaboration of other 
factors that might have played a role on the outcome of Fuel Insight. However, several 
additional findings have been identified, and I will present them shortly in this section: 
 Bunker Fuel Market: networks and politics affect bunker purchases. By providing 
transparency, Fuel Insight challenges these networks and reveal short- and longlifting. 
 Rumours of an impending sale of VPS: may have affected the motivation and created 
insecurity amongst employees working with Fuel Insight. 
 Focus on wrong customers due to cooperation (that did not happen) with BIMCO 
instead of focusing on already existing customers.80 
 Sales strategy: DNV tend to use the same network and contact persons when 
approaching their customers, but in this case it is argued that one should have aimed at 
decision-makers higher up in the target organisations when marketing Fuel Insight.81  
Understanding organisational innovation is crucial (van der Aa & Elfring 2000). DNV is an 
organisation, hence, it is important to understand the organisation and its structures when 
analysing the process of developing Fuel Insight. Being innovative provides the firm 
organisational and personal learning. Thus, an organisation learns to improve the things they 
already do, and the more an organisation does something, generally the better it becomes at 
doing it. However, innovations that involve “significant breakthroughs and fracture past ways 
of doing things pose great difficulties for organizations and the way they learn” (Dodgson & 
Gann 2010:35). With this in mind, Fuel Insight can be described as an innovation which 
would involve a radical new way of delivering a service in the bunker fuel market. Issues 
surrounding the bunker fuel market and its established networks, relations and politics is one 
of the main findings besides user-involvement, management and knowledge transfer, that 
possibly played an important role for the outcome of Fuel Insight. The influence of this 
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market might be more important than I have been able to point out in the thesis due to my 
choice of methods. Therefore, the remaining space of the analysis will provide a short 
discussion of this issue, as it is an important aspect to understand when looking at the 
innovation process of Fuel Insight as a whole. 
 
5.5.1 Politics and Networks 
The bunker fuel market is intricate, and a frequent argument for the failure of Fuel Insight 
concerns relationships and bribery within the bunker fuel market. How people choose 
suppliers is complex and not always rational. Acquaintances, culture and networks seem to 
play an important role in the selection of suppliers.82 The introduction of Fuel Insight was 
controversial as suppliers making an extra profit on short- and/or longlifting would be more 
easily unveiled. This could have led to a tensing of relationships for many fuel suppliers in 
numerous ports where shortlifting is likely to occur (Mestl et al. 2012, Fuel Insight (tool))83. 
Actors in the bunker fuel market are well aware that short- and longlifting happen, although 
do not seem to be talking about it much, probably due to existing relations and networks. Or 
as one of the former VPS employees stated; “There is always someone who does not want to 
find out what Fuel Insight says (…) because of relations. They have suppliers they have used 
for years that they prefer.”84 Hence, introducing Fuel Insight to this market could strain 
traditional collaboration between customers and suppliers, and the service could thus be 
perceived as ‘naming and shaming’ the actors in the market.85 Due to the strong ties in the 
bunker fuel market, one may argue that Fuel Insight most likely conflicted with these 
networks, leading to failure when attempting to launch the service to the market (Argote & 
Ingram 2000:158). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 Andreassen; Kadal & Svendsen; Løvoll; Mestl; Ramsrud; Wetterhus 
83 Andreassen 
84 Stirling 
85 Svendsen & Kadal; Stirling; Wetterhus 
52 
 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have identified what I believe were contributing factors to the unsuccessful 
launch of Fuel Insight. 
 
 
First, I elaborated on the issue of user-involvement by using the literature on service 
innovation to validate my assumptions that user-involvement was insufficient during the 
entire development process of Fuel Insight. Although I did not get the chance to interview any 
of the customers, I argued that the reluctance to give me access to interview the customers is 
strengthening my hypothesis on insufficient user involvement in the innovation process. The 
customers should have been involved to a larger extent in developing and shaping the service 
as active parties throughout the entire process.  
 
Next, I focused on management, mainly directing attention towards the organisational 
structure and price, as organisational innovation is emphasised by the literature as an 
53 
 
important form of innovation in the service industry. I argued that the structural organisation 
leading to internal costs as well as communication between the units were suboptimal. There 
is reason to argue that management planning was not sufficient as VPS overestimated what 
the market was willing to pay for the service, which in turn points to lack of market research. 
I also argued that commitment from the top management is of importance as the feeling of 
ownership to the service decreased and was delegated downwards in the organisation when 
the first Managing Director quit. 
 
Following, I argued that DNV was lacking competence on commercialising technological 
research with the additional complication that this was a new kind of service. They did not 
manage to translate complex technology into a language understood by the customers as Fuel 
Insight turned out to be a complex service that both DNV employees and customers struggled 
to understand. The implementation tool Cognos was not an optimal solution and the lack of 
flexibility in the tool made it difficult to develop a user-friendly service with an intuitive 
interface.   
 
I chose to focus on these three issues because user-involvement and knowledge transfer are 
emphasised frequently in the literature on service innovation. Management, on the other hand, 
has mostly been researched in connection with innovations within the manufacturing sector. 
Hence, my research contributes to studies on management in the service innovation (with an 
integrative approach). I argue that much of the same principles apply to management in the 
service sector as in the manufacturing sector, although there are some other concerns 
attributed to managing service innovation. One can clearly see from these three main issues 
that they overlap to a large extent. This demonstrates that an innovation process such as this is 
intertwined, and that there is not one singular reason to why Fuel Insight failed.  
 
Finally, I identified other factors that possibly influenced the outcome of Fuel Insight, and I 
highlighted the politics and networks of the bunker fuel market. I argued that the introduction 
of Fuel Insight to the market was controversial and may have turned out as a failure partly 
because it conflicted with the networks already in place in the market. 
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6.0 Conclusions  
In this research I have attempted to answer the research questions Why did Fuel Insight fail? 
Was user-involvement sufficient? How was the project managed; was management planning 
sufficient? How was technical knowledge transferred to the market? Introducing literature on 
service innovation focusing on user-involvement, management and knowledge transfer 
together with a case outline explaining the background for Fuel Insight, I have laid the 
foundation to do empirical research on the case which in turn provided me with several 
findings. These findings show that Fuel Insight failed mainly due to a combination of 
insufficient user-involvement, management planning and the challenge of commercialising 
and translating technological knowledge into market terms. However, additional findings may 
also possibly have affected the outcome of Fuel Insight. 
 
6.1 Implications 
This study has offered an insight into scaling research to operative services in-house in a 
highly technological firm with its main expertise on technology. Conducting the research, I 
logged my method to ensure potential replications. However, if given access to interview the 
customers, or if interviewing other informants at DNV, the conclusion may possibly have 
turned out different. Nevertheless, based on the conclusion of the thesis, this research has 
implications for both theory and practice. 
 
6.1.1 Theory implications 
This thesis has presented a case study on the entire innovation process of a service from 
research to market launch. It has revealed thorough information on the innovation process in 
this particular case. However, that does not mean that the same findings and conclusions will 
emerge from other cases of failed service innovations as it is not possible to make 
generalisations based on this single case study (Yin 2014:20). Undertaking such research, one 
has to be aware that there might be other ways of interpreting the case studied and the 
findings. If the findings can be repeated with similar results when following the same 
procedures in this and similar cases, it can contribute to theoretical propositions (Baxter 
2010:96). However, although trying to remain neutral, the interpretation of the findings will 
always be coloured by the researcher to a certain extent. 
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This research has studied innovation in services and contributed to the theory of service 
innovation by combining theory from the service-oriented and the technologist approach with 
findings from a case situated in the blurry line between the two approaches, strengthening the 
relevance of the integrative approach. 
 
6.1.2 Practical Implications 
This study has shown that developing a service from research to launch in-house requires 
expertise at each stage of the innovation process. The findings indicate that clear 
communication and thorough user-involvement can take the innovation a long way, but that 
management planning and access to personnel with sufficient competence in each stage of the 
process is necessary for the innovation to succeed.  
 
When developing new services where it is possible to increase the gap between production 
and consumption of the service, companies should seek to exploit this gap to involve users 
and adjust the service according to the feedback by making use of beta testing with end-users 
in the intended market. When deciding to develop a service from research to market 
application in-house, it is important to have support from upper management, to clarify the 
function of the service and to be aware of the company’s weaknesses and involve external 
expertise if necessary. It is important to do proper market research, involve users and not 
make decisions based on assumptions on the market at the users. 
 
6.2 Limitations of this Research 
A limitation of this study is that it has not included the opinions of the customers involved in 
the development process of Fuel Insight. The focus has solely been from DNV’s point of view 
and their experience with the project. 
 
It would be interesting to get access to the customers’ opinions and ideas, as this would 
strengthen the validity of the research. Including the customers even after the service was 
closed down, could contribute to assist DNV in future project of similar characteristics, as 
well as it might open up for a re-launch of Fuel Insight if relevant feedback is provided, and if 
the customers still request such service. 
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6.3 Practical Suggestions 
Based on theory and empirical findings presented in this research, I come up with the 
following advice to firms that plan to develop a similar IT service and to DNV if they choose 
to try the luck with Fuel Insight once more:  
 Users: involve customers throughout the entire process 
 User-friendliness: have users participating actively in developing the interface and 
layout 
 Make use of beta types: it is ok to launch the benchmarks (or functions) one at a time 
instead of all benchmarks at once 
 Organisation: sort out organisational structure and internal costs 
 Management: commitment from top management 
 Commercialisation: use external expertise if the firm has little experience with this 
 Sort out the complexity of the system, agree on the function of the service and be clear 
about the limitations and opportunities of the tool 
 Communicate: be clear about what you think, your aims, and listen and explain 
 
6.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
Services create over two thirds of the value added in most industrial countries. Hence, it is 
important to understand innovation in services due to the economic importance of the sector, 
and the impact it has on growth, both in terms of economy and social aspects. Suggestions for 
further research would be to include more studies approaching customers examining their 
interaction in the development of services throughout the innovation process. Further research 
may also adopt a different approach by addressing the bunker fuel market to broaden the 
comprehension of the failure of Fuel Insight.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
 
List of informants 86 
Name Position Department Type Date 
Grunde Løvoll 
Thomas Mestl 
Senior Researcher  
Senior Researcher  
 
DNV R&I 
Introductory group 
interview 
 
12.02.2014 
Tore Morten 
Wetterhus 
Managing Director 
(former) 
 
VPS 
 
Interview 
 
19.02.2014 
 
John Stirling 
Business 
Development 
Manager (former) 
 
VPS 
 
Interview 
 
06.03.2014 
Sten Svendsen 
 
 
Jørgen Kadal 
Head of Section – 
Production Data 
Management 
External Business 
Domain Responsible 
 
 
DNV Metric Centre 
(IT) 
 
 
Group interview 
 
 
07.04.2014 
 
Kristian Ramsrud 
Business Intelligence 
Architect 
 
DNV Metric Centre 
(IT) 
 
Interview 
 
07.04.2014 
 
Jostein Furnes 
CFO DNV GL 
Maritime, Oil and 
Gas 
 
DNV Advisory 
Board 
 
Interview 
 
21.05.2014 
 
Eirik Andreassen 
Managing Director 
(present) 
 
VPS 
Skype interview from 
Singapore 
 
02.06.2014 
 
Grunde Løvoll 
 
Senior Researcher  
 
DNV R&I 
 
Interview 
 
16.06.2014 
 
Thomas Mestl 
 
Senior Researcher  
 
DNV R&I 
 
Interview 
 
20.06.2014 
 
Bjørn Olav Odland 
Customer Service 
Manager 
 
VPS 
 
Interview 
 
03.07.2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 DNV R&I: Det norske Veritas Research and Innovation, VPS: Veritas Petroleum Services, DNV Metric Centre: 
Det norske Veritas Metric Centre 
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Appendix B 
 
Intervjuguide 
 
Navn: 
Dato: 
Stilling: 
 
1. Forståelse av prosjektet Fuel Insight 
- Gi din presentasjon av prosessforløpet (raskt)   
- Hva ble din rolle i utviklingen av tjenesten? 
- Ansvarsoppgaver? 
- Hvem ga premissene for prosjektet?  
- Var formål, organisasjon, fremdrift avgjort på forhånd?  
- Hvem har sittet med styringa/autoritet?  
- Største utfordringer?  
 
2. Avgjørende faktorer (personlig oppfatning)  
- Hva var ditt inntrykk av Fuel Insight?  
- Hva er de viktigste faktorene for at resultatet ble som det ble?  
- Er det noen særlig avgjørende beslutninger som har spilt inn på resultatet?  
- Hva var dine prioriteringer i prosjektet? 
- Hvordan ble resultatet i forhold til dine forventninger?   
- Hva har fungert bra? Hvorfor?  
- Hva har fungert dårlig? 
 
3. Organisasjonsstruktur, samarbeid og kommunikasjon 
- Hvordan vil du beskrive samarbeidet mellom avdelingene i DNV underveis i utviklingen? 
- Hvordan var kommunikasjonen? 
- Hvem opererte som beslutningstakere? 
- Var noen mer passive/aktive enn andre? 
 
4. Marked og utviklingsprosess 
- Hvordan vil du beskrive Cognos? 
- Hvordan vil du beskrive bunker fuel-markedet?  
- Var det vanskelig å selge Fuel Insight inn i markedet? 
- Hvordan vil du beskrive kommersialiseringen (kommersialiseringsprosessen) av Fuel 
Insight? 
- Hvordan markedsførte dere prosjektet underveis i utviklingen og testperioden? 
- Hva tenker du om involveringen av kunder i utviklingsprosessen? 
- På hvilken måte ble disse kundene involvert? 
- Hvordan vil du beskrive samarbeidet? 
- Hva slags tilbakemeldinger fikk dere fra testkundene (spesielt da Fuel Insight ikke slo an)? 
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- Ble markedet involvert på andre måter? 
  
5. Resultat  
- Hva slags tanker har du om resultatet av tjenesten? 
- Har du tenkt at ting burde blitt gjort annerledes?  
- Hvilke ting? Hvorfor?  
- Hva tror du er grunnen(e) til at Fuel Insight ikke slo an? 
 
 
